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I. INTRODUCTION
In July 2017, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws (NCCUSL) approved and recommended for enactment in all
U.S. states a new Uniform Parentage Act (UPA). 1 This Act follows the
1973 2 and 20003 UPAs, which have been widely adopted.4 While all three
UPAs recognize forms of childcare parentage beyond biological ties (in
and outside of marital births) and formal adoptions, the 2017 UPA is
quite expansive in recognizing such forms, including in its provisions on

*Professor Emeritus, Northern Illinoia University College of Law. olby College (B.A.,
1970); University of Chicago Law School (J.D., 1974). Thanks to Deven Tlanda and Jessica
Theodoratos, 2Ls at Northern Illinois University College of Law, for their excellent
assistance. Copyright 2019. All righJs reserved.
The title of this Article derives from Rebecca Aviel's wonderful piece, Faithful Unions,
69 HAS'l'INGSL.J. 721 (2018) wherein she reviews why the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
U.S. CONS'f. art. IV, § 1, has not been employ d in choice of marriage Jaw cases and how
such cases are resolved. Herein, [ review choice of parentage law cases wherein again the
Full Faith and Credit Clause has not been significantly employed. It should be, at least in
certain settings. Sucb limited settings in marriage cases may involve phu·al marriage.
Aviel, supl'a at 767- 68. Herein, I suggest possible employment of both constitutional and
non-constitutionru directives on cho~ce of law in impt·ecise parentage cases, that is, cases
where childcare parenthood is determined judicially by examining earlier conduct occuning
at no precise time (like holding out a child as one's own), with an analysis dependent upon
110 definitive conduct (like marriage to a birth mother at the ti.me of birth arising from
consensual sex).
1. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017). A review of the 2017 UPA, its
predecessors, and its goals is provided by its Reporter in Courtney G. Joslin, Nurturing
Parenthood Through the UPA (2017), 127YALE L .J.F. 589, 597-99 (2018).
2. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1973).
3. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2000).
4. NCCUSL tracks state governmental uses of its varying UPAs,' with the results
summarized on its website. UNIF. L. COMM'N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/home (last
visited Dec. 13, 2018).

325

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3251452

326

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

de facto parentage,5 voluntary acknowledgment parentage, 6 and
intended parentage of children born of assisted reproduction. 7 These
expanded forms of childcare parentage, relevant to child custody,
visitation, and support issues, are chiefly dependent on childcare
agreements and parental-like acts rather than on blood ties or formal
adoptions.
This Article focuses on the choice of law problems arising with these
expanded forms of childcare parentage. 8 First, it reviews the UPAs on
choice of law and on the expansive forms of childcare parentage. Second,
it demonstrates the challenging choice of law issues when childcare
parentage issues arise after interstate moves but depend upon premove
behavior which is not precise (not like giving birth) or which occurs at no
particular time (not like marriage to a birth mother at the time of birth).
Third, the Article posits that in declaring forum laws usually apply when
adjudicating expansive childcare parentage issues, perhaps relying upon
the UPAs, courts should expresslyTecognize that forum laws sometimes
include their own choice of law rules. Such recognition should · be
explicitly noted in an amended 2017 UPA. This approach follows
precedents on choosing between conflicting state laws in and outside of
family law settings. It also honors reasonable expectations, lessens forum
shopping, and avoids Full Faith and Credit difficulties where there are
parentage-related
"public
acts,"
like
voluntary
parentage
acknowledgments, whose validity often turn on imprecise conduct
occurring at no particular time, like fraud or duress.
Finally, the Article posits that state courts, and the NCCUSL in its
2017 UPA, should establish some special rules on choice of parentage
laws. Special rules should operate when courts hear challenges to
voluntary parentage acknowledgments (VAPs), with application of the

6. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 609 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017).
6. Id.§ 301.
7. Id.§ 701.
8. Choice of Law problems are particularly challenging as there is no state that is a
"piace of celebration," that is, a state which "exercised regulatory authority over a domiciled
couple" like a state exercises in recognizing a marriage. Aviel, supra note *, at 769-70.
Professor Aviel does not discuss the challenging choice of law issues that would arise where
there was an attempt to have one U.S. state recognize a common law marriage arising from
purely private. agreements or marital-like acts in a second state. In marriage settings,
choice of law problems might also arise where there is no definite site that is the place of
dissolution or where the time of dissolution is key to distinguishing between marital and
nonmarital property in marital asset distribution. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3105.171(A)(2) (2018) ("[use of] date of the final hearing in an action for divorce" for asset
distribution purposes can be overcome if "inequitable"); Iske v. Iske, 100 N.E.3d 957,
964-66 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017) (applying OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.171(A)(2)).
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VAP challenge laws of the state where the VAP was filed. 9 Special rules
should also operate in some spousal parentage and assisted reproduction
cases.

II.

CHOICE OF LAW UNDER THE

UPA

The UPAs have different approaches to choice of childcare parentage
laws issues. The 1973 Uniform Parentage Act (1973 UPA) says a
parentage action "may be brought iu the county in which the child or the
al1eg d father resides or i found or, if the fath r is deceased, in which
proceedings for proba e of his estate have been or could be commenced." 10
It does not speak generally to choice of law.
The 2000 Uniform Parentage Act (2000 UPA) generally addresses
choice of law in childcare parentage disputes. It says that a court shall
apply its own law "to adjudicate the parent-child relationship."11 This
norm does not depend on either "the place of birth of th child" or "the
past or present residence of the cbild."L2 As "for a proceeding to adjudicate
parentage," possible venues include a county in which "(l) the child
resides or is found; (2) the [respondent] resi des or is found if the child
does not reside in this State; or (3) a proceeding for probate of the
presumed or alleged father's estate has been commenced." 13 Further, the
2000 UPA specifically addresses choice oflaw where childcar pru·entage
allegedly flows from a V AP undertaken elsew h ere.14
The 2017 Uniform Parentage Act (2017 UPA) says the applicable law
does not depend on "the place of birth of the child" or "the past or present
residence of the child,'' 15 with the court to apply its own law "to adjudicate

9. It may never be that VAPs are wholly or partially signed in one state and filed in
another. If that happens, the law of the filing state should apply to VAP challenges as state
V AP forms inform the signors of the applicable challenge norms, upon which they should
reasonably be Able to rely. AB well, factual issues r lated to VAP challenges would mos t
always involve conduct occurring before signing, as with fraud, dui·ess, or marital mistake
of fact.
10. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 8(c) (UNIF. LAW CoMM'N 1973).
11. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 103(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2000).
L2. [d. § 103(b)(l), (2). Th.ese provisions on forum law application apply regardless of
place oI birth or residence and operate in sever.al American jui;isdictions. See, e.g., DEL.
CODEANN. tit. 13, § 8-103(b) (2018): 750 ILL. C MP. ''l'AT. ANN. 461104 (LexisN xis 2018 ;
ME. STAT. tit. 19·A, § 1833(2) (2018); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-20-03(2) (2018); N.M. STAT.
ANN.§ 40-11A-103(B) (LexisNexis 2018); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7700-103(8) (2018); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN.§ 26.26.021(2) (LexisNexis 2018).
13. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 605.
14. Id. § 311 ("full faith and credit" to a VAP "effective in another state" if"signed" and
"otherwise in compliance" with the other state's law).
15. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 105 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017).
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parentage." 16 Venue in "a proceeding to adjudicate parentage" is
appropriate in a county in which "the child resides or is [found];" in a
county where "the [respondent] resides or is [found]" if the child resides
out of state; or in a county where there is commenced a proceeding "for
administration of the estate of a [person] who is or may be a parent."17
Thus, the 2017 UPA choice of law and venue norms substantially follow
the 2000 UPA. Like the 2000 UPA, the 201 7 UPA has a special choice of
law provision for VAPs.1s
The UPAs were said to follow the Uniform Interstate Family Support
Act (UIFSA) 19 in declaring forum state law applicable to adjudicate the
parent-child relationship in 2000 and to adjudicate parentage in 2011.20
In each instance, the UPA Comment asserts that this ·.d irective
"simplifies choice of law principles," though recognizing that should the
chosen state provide "an inappropriate forum, dismissal for forum
non-conveniens may be appropriate."2 1
The 1996 and 2008 versions of the UIFSA generally speak to how a
"responding tribunal" should proceed when asked by an "initiating
tribunal" to determine the duty of, and amount payable for, child
support. 22 Here, the respondent in a child support proceeding is not
subject to personal jurisdiction in the initiating tribunal.23 So the
initiating asks a responding tribun_al where there is personal jurisdiction
to act. The responding tribunal, in hearing child support issues, is
recognized as sometimes having first to "determine parentage."24 In so
16. Id. The 2017 UPA provision on choice of forum law "to adjudicate parentage"
already has been presented in several American state legislatures. See, e.g., Uniform
Parentage Act, 2017 Bill Text R.I. H.B. 7226, at§ 15-8.1-1.105; House Bill 562, 2017 Vt.
Adv. Legis. Serv. 562, at§ 103(b) (LexisNexis); Uniform Parentage Act, 2017 Bill Text Wa.
S.B. 6037, at§ 105.
17. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 605.
18. Id. § 311.
19. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT§ 303 (NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF.
ST. LAWS 1996).
20. The 2000 comment (amended 2002) points to § 303 of the UIFSA, while the 2017
comments point to the 2000 UPA as well as the 1996 UIFSA. The 2000 comment does not
expressly speak to its newly adopted choice of law doctrine not found in the 1973 UPA.
21. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 103 cmt. (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2000).
22. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 301(b) (NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON
UNIF. ST. LAWS 2008); UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 30l(c) (NAT'L CONF. OF
COMM'RS ON UNIF. ST. LAWS 1996).
23. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 301(b) (NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON
UNIF. ST. LAWS 2008); UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 30l(c) (NAT'L CONF. OF
COMM'RS ON UNIF. ST. LAWS 1996).
24. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 305(b)(l) (NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON
UNIF. ST. LAWS 1996).
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determining, the 1996 UIFSA declares that the responding tribunal shall
apply the pr cedural and substantive law, including the rules on choice
of law, genernlly applicable to similar proceedings originating in its
state."25 It also declares that a determination of' the duty of support and
the amount payable" should be in accordance wi.th its own state's "law
and support guidelines."26
For a child support proceeding in a responding tribunal, the 2008
UIFSA declares the responding court shall apply "the procedural and
substantive law generally applicable to similar proceedings originating"
in the state.27 The 2001 UIFSA2B struck the provision on employing at
times "the rules on choice of law." 29 As in the 1996 UIFSA, the 2008
UIFSA declares that the determination of the duty of support and
amount payable should be in accordance with its own state's "law and
support guidelines." 30 States following the 2008 UIFSA, when making no
reference to possibly employing its own "rules on choice oflaw," generally
view these reference failures as non-substantive.31
Seemingly, both the 2000 UPA on "parent--<:hild relationship"
adjudications and the 2017 UPA on "parentage" adjudications32 require
one U.S. state court, preswnably using its own choice oflaw rules or the
Full Faith and Credit Clause 33 dictate, to respect another U.S. state
25. Id. § 202 (emphasis added).
26. ld. § 303(2). These provisions continue to operate in several Americanjudsclictions.
See, e.g., 5 GUAM CODE ANN. § 35303 (2018); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 8, § 64.3(b) (2018): Wrs.
STA'I'. § 769.303 (2018); see also UNlF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT AC'!' § 701(b) ("In a
proc eding to cletm:min.o parentage, a rosponclingtribunalofthis State shall apply" the laws
of this State, including "the mies ... on choice of law." (emphasi1;1 added)).
27. UNIF. INTERS'l.'ATE FAMJLY SUPPORT Am § 303(1) (NNr'L CoNF. OF COMM'RS ON
UNIF. ST. LAWS 2008).
28. UNTF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT (NAT'L CONF. OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. ST.
LAWS 2001).
29. Id. § 303(1). The 2001 UIFSA sole provision on choice of law seemingly did not
innndaLe that a responding tribunal u ilize the pru.·en;tage determination laws of anolher
1,tate. Id. § 604; see also id. § 701(b) (eliminating the refet·ence to a r sponcling cou1t 's use
of its rules on choice o£Jaw).
30. mm. INTERSTA'l'E FAMILY SUPPORT Ac·r § 303(2) (NAT'L ONF. OF COMM'Rs ON
UN!F. ST. LAWS 2008). These provisions on child support decisions and guidelines, withouL
rnferencing a choic of luw r ule, operate in severalAmerican jurisdictions. See, e.g., COLO.
REV. ''l'AT. § 14-6-303 (2018); fOWA CODE § 252K.303 (2018); NEV. REV. S'l'AT. ANN.
§ 130.303 (LexisNexis 2018); VA. ODE ANN. § 20-88.46 (2018).
31. See, e.g., fOWA Com;§ 252K.303 (statutory note); NEV. fi.EV. STAT. ANN.§ 130.303
(statutory note); VA. CODIJ! I\NN. § 20-88.46 (statutory note).
32. In the 2017 UPA, the Comment. does not address what, if n.ny, differetlce exists
between adjudicatiolls of " he parent-child relationship" and adjudications of ''parent.age."
UNrF. PARJJ:N'l'AGE AC'I' § 105 cmt. (UNlF. LAW COMM'N 2017).
33. U.S. CONST. art. IV, §1.
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court's eai-lier formal recognition of a person's parentage. uch a formal
recognition can :learly arise from an actual civil or administrative case
judgment or from a VAP.34
In following the UPAs, U.S. states may have childcar parent laws
dependent upon a marital-related birth 01· upon a residency or holding
out of a child as one's own.36 Here, ther - is no formal parentage
recognition in the initiating state even though the parentage r quisites
have be n met. Further, the 2017 UPA jntroduces an w form of legal
parenthood, de facto parentage, which is far less precise.:l6 As with
marital or resident and hold out parentage, this new fol'm usually goes
unrecognized in the initiating state via a form 1 act, like a cotu't
judgment, as soon as, or shortly after, its standards have been met. So,
the 2000 and 2017 UPAs invit a responding tribunal to employ its own
forms of imprecise childcare parentage to case where the relevant acts
wholly or substantially occurred in the state of th initiating tribunal.
Both the 2000 and 2017 UPAs suggest that forum law on childcare
parentage shall apply to 'adjudicate" issues of 'parent-child
.relationship" and 'parentage" under imprecise parentage laws. State
34. UNW. PARENTAG.El Am' § 311 ('•I'he <!ourt shall give Cull faith and credit to an
acknowl dgmen-t of parentage o.r denial of parantage effective in another state if the
acknowledgement or denial was in a signed record and otherwise complies with law of the
other state."). Undoubtedly, this need to recognize propedy ex cuted VAPs from. other
states was prompted by the federal statutory mandate (for states participating in the
federal Temporary Assistance for Needy Fammes (TANF) progrnm covering welfare
subsidies) that "full faith and credit" be given to "other state" VAPs. 42 U.S.C.
§ 666(a)(5)(C)(iv) (2018). Once recognized, a VAP from another state potentially can be
overcome, usually through a recession by a signatory within sixty clays or by a challenge
therenfte:r. While any post-sixty-day challenge is required by federal statute to be founded
ot, "fraud, duress, 01· material miatake of fact, ' 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(D)(iii) (2018), state
laws vary on what those requisites mean, as well as on other procedures for VAP challenges,
including who can challenge and when challenges at untimely (eitl101· due to failure to
meet a prescribed time pe1·iod Ol' due to equitable estuppel principles). Ou variations in state
VAP laws, see infra Sectiun N(B).
35. ln these 1.atter two settings, the recognition would not be embodi din a fonna l act,
but in the satis faction of a norm guiding "parent- child" or ''pru:entage" eatablish.ment.s. No
preced nts have been found tha deem such sat.i,sfactiou in on state prompts leg'al status
recogn.ition without a court ordcu· (or other fol'mnl act) in that state.
36. The 1973 UPA.recognfaed a sign.ificantiorm of imprecise pni·entage when it deemed
presumptive natw-al fatherhood in a man who, "while the child is under the age of
majority .. . receives th child into his home and openly holds out. the child as his natural
child." UN1F. PAREN'l'AOE ACf § 4(a)(4) (UNil'. LAW OMM'N 1973). The imprecision was
dramatically reduced .i n th e 2000 and 2017 OPAs, which 1·equi·r e a holdiug out pai.·ent (who
could be o woman under the 2017 UP.A.) to reside in Lhe same hous hold with the child for
the first two yen.rs of the child's l.ili . UN!.F. PAREN'rA EA I'§ 204.(a)(2) (UNJ.1". LAW COMJllt'N
2017); see also UNU'. PARRN'l'AOE AC'l' § 204.(a)(:i) (amended 2002) (UNTF'. LAW COMM'N
2000) .
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lawmakers have, infact, dictated the us of forum laws in these imprecise
parentage cases. Thus, in Virginia, by stai-ute ihe courts must mploy the
Virginia assisted reproduction laws "without exception in any action ...
to nforce or adjudicate any rights or rnsponsibilities.''37
U.S. state parentage laws do vary a bit in their language on choice of
law in particular circumstances. Some special laws speak to then ed to
give "full faith and credit" to a paternity acknowledgment undertaken in
another American state "according to its procedures." 38 Wher allowed,
maternity acknowledgments are similarly deemed creditable.39 Other
special U.S. state laws additionally require explicitly that "full faith and
credit" be given to a "denial of paternity ' in a VAP if undertaken in
another state in compliance with the law of the other state. 40 Other
special U.S. state laws on choice of law in parent-child and parentage
settings are broader. Thus, some state laws speak to the need to give "foll
faith and credit" not only to a sister state VAP, but also to a sister state
paternity "determination" made "through an administrative or judicial
process." 41
A few U.S. states recognize "full faith and credit" r espect for a
paternity determination via an administrative or judicial process in a
sis er state by xpressly recognizing the need to defer to a paternity
determination "made by any other state or jurisdiction." 42 Importantly
though, there still needs to be a "determination." This suggests there
needs to be a formal U.S. state recognition elsewhere of a pal'ticula.r
childcare parent, rather than a law els where that just recognizes
37. VA. CODE ANN.§ 20-157 (2018),
38. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. S'l'AT. § 461)-l 72(a)(4) (2018); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5103(d)
(2018); see also RAW. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 584-3.5(g) (LexisNexis 2018) ("full faith tlnd credit
lo am.davits" for VAPs, which "constitute legal findings''); LA. STAT. ANN. ·§ 9:393 (2018) ("i11
accotda.nce with the laws and procedures of that state'').
39. VT. STAT. ANN. t it. 15C, § 301 (2018); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 26.26.10 1 (2018).
40. ee, e.g., ALA. CODE§ 26-17-311 (LexisNexis 2018); DEL. CODE ANN. 13, § 8-311
(2018); N.D. C~NT. CODE § 14-20-21 (2018); N.M. STA'l'. ANN. § 40-1.1&311 (2018); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 10, § 7700-3ll (2018); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.311 (West 2018); WYO. S'l'A'l'.
Al\1N. § 14 -2-611 (2018). Noncompliance can involvo, for example, slgning a VAP [urm
outside th state whose VAP form was used. See, e.g., Teague v. Teague, 999 So. 2d 86, 92
(La. Ct. App. 2008) (I.ndiana fol'lll signed in Louisiana).
41. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 5604 (Deering 2018); N w York Family ourt Act
616-a(d) ·(2018); see also N .H. REV. STAT.ANN. § 168-A:2(Il) (Lexis Nexis 2018) ('[paternity)
estabfuihed by court or administrativ order"). California has a separate statute addressing
only th e "force and ffect" of a VAF. CAL. FAM. CODE§ 7573 (Deering 2018).
42. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2208(d) (2018) (including a determination "established by
judicial oi- a.dministi:ativ process or by voluntary acknowledgement") . Similar is CAL. FAM.
CODE § 6604 (Deering 2018). Cf N.R REV. S'l'AT. ANN. § 16 -A:2(II) (2018) (containing
language similar ~o Kansas statute, but also requiring ndl feit:h and ci· ditto a paternity
"determination" by uop ration of anoth r state's law").
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generally that childcar · parentage can arise from certain imprecise
conduct (namely, par ental_-like acts).

III. BEYOND BIOLOGY AND FORMAL ADOPTION:

EXPANDED FORMS OF
PARENTAGE UNDER THE UPA

The UPAs have always recognized some form of childcare parentage
not necessarily dependent upon actual proof of biological ties or formal
adoptions. Under all three UPAs childcare parentage can arise, or be
challenged, under less precise standards. Such standards involve marital
births; VAPs; residency or hold out parenting; de facto parenting; and
parenthood via assisted human reproduction agreements. :It is with the
employment of the less precise standards in establishing and
disestablishing childcare parentage that choice of law and full faith and
credit issues can arise.
A. Spousal Parentage

The 1973 UPA recognizes that "[a] man is presumed to be the natural
father of a child if .. . he and the child's natural mother are or have been
married to each oth r and the child is born during the marriage, or within
300 days after the marriage is te.rminated ."'13 S mingly, fo1· children
born to their spouses via 'artificial insemination" utilizing the semen not
donated by the husbands, there are additional r quirements, including
husband "consent" a nd "supe)."vision of a licensed physician." 44
Th 2000 UPA, as a mended in 2002, sjmilady recognizes presumptive
mai·ital parentage as well as non-_pres umptiv marital parentage via
consent to "assis ted r eprodUc tion" and non-presumptive parentage via a
"validated" ges tational mother ' agreement." 45 The marital paren tage
presumption expressly applies to a ma n mru.Tied to the mo ther when "th
child is born," or that was married to the mother when the child is born
"within 300 days after the marriage is terminated."46 As to a child born
43. O Nrf'. PARENTAGE ACT § 4(~)(1) (Ul'{n;', LAW COMM'N 1973). The 1973 OPA also
rec gni.zes- ma le paren tage presLLmptions in certain men who married or attempted to
mar:ry Lhe natural moth 1'$ before or a fter the births. id.§ 4(a)(2) (3).
44. Id. § 5. 0 th r forms of artilicja ) i1Jse mina tion, raisi ng "complex a nd serio·us legal
problems." are not dealt with as wiui noted in the § 5 comment. ld . F ailure to follow§ 5
mandat s may nevei-theless p,ompt a marital pn1:entag0 presump tion under § 4 for a child
born of a rtificia l insemina tion. See; e,g., id. § 4(a)(l) (presum ing the bu1,band is t he natural
father of a chi ld born to his wife "dul'ing the marriage'·? .
45. UN!F. PARENTAGE ACT § 20l(b)(l), (5), (6) (a mended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N
2000) .
46. Id. § 204(a)(l), (2). As with the 1973 UPA, there is also a marital pm:entage
presumption for a mu n who attempted to marry the birth mother before the child 's birth
and the child is born "during the invalid marriage or within 300 days after its termination,"
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to a married mother via assisted reproduction, a husband is a parent if
he "provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted reproduction" per the
UPA requisites. 4 7 Within two years of birth, the husband may dispute
paternity if he did not consent. 48 If the husband did not provide sperm
and did not consent, he may pursue "at any time" an adjudication of
non-paternity where he and the mother "have not cohabited since the
probable time of assisted reproduction" and he "never openly held out the
child as his own." 49 As to a child born to a gestational carrier where there
is a validated agreement, a husband and his wife are parents unless the
agreement is terminated.50
The 2017 UPA also recognizes a marital parentage presumption. It
expressly applies to both male and female spouses who are married to
the birth mother at the time of birth; married to the birth mother within
300 days of the marriage's termination; or married to the birth mother
after the child's birth as long as the spouses "asserted parentage."51
Non-presumptive parentage attaches to consenting spouses of birth
mothers, as under the 2000 UPA, who give birth via "assisted
reproduction." 52 Non-presumptive parentage also attaches to married
spouses (and others) where there are either gestational or genetic
surrogacy agreements. 5 3

B. Voluntary Parentage Acknowledgment
The 1973 UPA recognized that "[a] man is presumed to be the natural
father of a child," thus prompting parental childcare interests, if "he
acknowledges his paternity ... in a writing" filed with the state, which
is not disputed by the birth mother "within a reasonable time after being
informed."5 4 Rebuttal of such a presumption occurs only with "clear and
convincing evidence" of no biological ties and "a court decree establishing
paternity of the child by another man." 55

id. § 204(a)(3), as well as for a man who married or tried to marry the mother "after the
birth of the child" and who "voluntarily asserted his paternity of the child." Id. § 204(a)(4),
47. Id.§ 703 (containing the consent requisites in§ 704).
48. Id. § 705(a).
49. Id. § 705(b).
50. Id. § 806.
51. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 204(a)(l) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017).
52. Id. § 703 (containing the consent requisites in§ 704).
53. Id. §§ 802-807 (containing comparable requirements for each form of agreement,
with additional special rules for gestational surrogacy pacts, at §§ 808-812, and for genetic
surrogacy pacts, at§§ 813-818).
54. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 4(a)(5) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1973).
55. Id. § 4(b).
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The 2000 UPA, as amended in 2002, recognized no parentage
presumption for a male VAP signor. 56 It did recognize the birth mother
and "a man claiming to be the genetic father of the child may sign an
acknowledgment of paternity with intent to establish the man's
paternity."57 The 2000 UPA declared a VAP could be rescinded within
sixty days of its effective date by a "signatory."58 Thereafter, a signatory
could commence a court case to "challenge" the VAP, but only on "the
basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact" within two years of the
VAP filing. 59
The 2017 UPA again recognizes VAPs establish nonmarital parentchild relationships without a presumption. 60 Parentage establishments
can now be undertaken by an expanded field of VAP signatories,
including those who claim to be "an alleged genetic father" of the child
born of sex;61 a presumed parent (man or woman) due to an alleged or
actual marriage or a holding out of the child as one's own while residing
in the same household with the child "for the first two years of the life of
the child;"62 and, an intended parent (man or woman) in a non-surrogacy,
assisted reproduction setting. 63 VAPs now may be undertaken "before or
after the birth of the child." 64 As with the 2000 UPA, signatories may
rescind within sixty days. 65 Challenges may proceed thereafter, "[B]ut
not later than two years after the effective date" and "only on the basis
of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact." 66 While non-signatory VAP
challenges may be pursued within "two years after the effective date of
the acknowledgement," challenges, except those presented by a child, will
be sustained only when a judge finds the child's "best interest" is served. 67
56. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a) (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2000).
57. Id. § 301. The accompanying Comment indicates that "a sworn assertion of genetic
parentage of the child" is needed though not "explicitly" required by federal welfare subsidy
statutes that often prompt state VAP laws, a federal statutory "omission" that is corrected
in the 2000 UPA. Id. § 301 cmt. The Comment also recogniz£ a male sperm donor may
undertake a VAP in an assisted reproduction setting where his "partner" is the birth
mother. Id.
58. Id. § 307.
59. Id. § 308(a).
60. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(5) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017). Some marital
parentage presumptions, including marriages occurring after birth, can be prompted by
parentage assertions in records filed with the state. Id. § 204(a)(C)(i).
61. Id. § 301.
62. Id. §§ 301, 204(a)(2).
63. Id. §§ 301, 703.
64. Id. § 304(b).
65. Id. § 308(a)(l) (allowing rescission within two months of their effective dates).
66. Id. § 309(a).
67. Id. §§ 309(b), 610(b)(l), (2).
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Non-signatory challengers are limited. Those with standing include the
child; the woman who gave birth who, as yet, has not been deemed a
nonparent; a parent under the 2017 UPA; "an individual whose
parentage of the child is to be adjudicated;" an adoption agency; and a
child support, or other authorized, governmental agency. 68
The explicit recognition in the 2017 UPA that VAPs may be
undertaken by those with no biological ties to the children whom they
acknowledge is revolutionary, clearly allowing circumvention of formal
adoption laws and the safeguards they provide for children, including
background checks and best interest findings. A Comment in the 2000
UPA lamented that the federal statutes guiding state VAP laws do not
"require that a man acknowledging paternity must assert genetic
paternity" and indicated the 2000 UPA was "designed to prevent
circumvention of adoption laws by requiring a sworn assertion of genetic
parentage of the child." 69 In 2017 the UPA policy on VAPs changed
dramatically.

C. Residency and Hold Out Parentage
The 1973 UPA has the following parentage presumption: "(a) A man
is presumed to be the natural father of a child if ... (4) while the child is
under the age of majority, he receives the child into his home and openly
holds out the child as his natural child." 70 The 2000 UPA altered the
holding out parentage presumption. It says, "(a) A man is presumed to
be the father of a child if: ... (5) for the first two years of the child's life,
he resided in the same household with the child and openly held out the
child as his own." 71 The 2017 UPA again altered the holding out
parentage presumption. It says,
(a) An individual is presumed to be a parent of a child if: ... (2) the
individual resided in the same household with the child for the first
two years of the life of the child, including any period of temporary
absence, and openly held out the child as the individual's child. 72

While expanding the VAP route to childcare parentage in 2017, the
last two UPAs contracted the childcare parentage opportunities for those
living with, and supporting, nonmarital children without VAPs or

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. §§ 602, 610(b).

UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 3 cmt. (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2000).
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 4(a)(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1973).
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 204(a)(5) (amended 2002) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2000).
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 204(a)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017).
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assisted reproduction pacts. Since 2000, an alleged residency or holdout
parent must begin to rear the child upon the child's birth.

D. De Facto Parentage
The 2017 UPA adds a "de facto parentage provision," an expanded
form of childcare parentage that is far less precise than the two-year
hold-out parentage presumption. De facto parenthood encompasses
human acts occurring at no particular time or in no particular place. The
2017 UPA says
(a) A proceeding to establish parentage of a child under this section
may be commenced only by an individual who: (1) is alive when the
proceeding is commenced; and (2) claims to be a de facto parent of the
child.
(b) An individual who claims to be a de facto parent of a child must
commence a proceeding ... (1) before the child attains [eighteen] years
of age; and (2) while the child is alive ....

(d) In a proceeding to adjudicate parentage of an individual who claims
to be a de facto parent of the child, if there is only one other individual
who is a parent or has a claim to parentage of the child, the court shall
adjudicate the individual who claims to be a de facto parent to be a
parent of the child if the individual demonstrates by
clear-and-convincing evidence that:
(1) the individual resided with the child as a regular member of
the child's household for a significant period;
(2) the individual engaged in consistent caretaking of the child;
(3) the individual undertook full and permanent responsibilities
of a parent of the child without expectation of financial
compensation;
(4) the individual held out the child as the individual's child;
(5) the individual established a bonded and dependent
relationship with the child which is parental in nature;
(6) another parent of the child fostered or supported the bonded
and dependent relationship required under paragraph (5); and
(7) continuing the relationship between the individual and the
child is in the best interest of the child.
(e) ... [I]fin a proceeding to adjudicate parentage of an individual who
claims to be a de facto parent of the child, there is more than one other
individual who is a parent or has a claim to parentage of the child and
the court determines that the requirements [of paragraphs (1) through
(7)] of subsection (d) are satisfied, the court shall adjudicate parentage
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under Section 613[, subject to other applicable limitations in this
part]. 73

E. Parentage Following Assisted Reproduction Births
1. No Surrogate
In response to the increasing numbers of children born of assisted
reproduction, the 2017 UPA has distinct articles on non-surrogacy and
surrogacy births. In non-surrogacy settings, the 2017 UPA "is
substantively similar" to the 2000 UPA, updated in 2002, with the
"primary changes ... intended to update the article so that it applies
equally to same-sex couples."74 The 2017 UPA thus recognizes that a
donor, in the absence of consent or common residence in the first .two
years while holding out a child as one's own, "is not a parent of a child
conceived by assisted reproduction." 76 The non-parental status of one
married to a child caring birth mother of a child born by assisted
reproduction, even if a gamete donor, may be established by a showing of
a lack of consent and of no holding out of the child as one's own. 76

2. Surrogate
As to surrogacy, the 2017 UPA-like the 2000 UPA, as amended in
2002-distinguishes between genetic (traditional) and gestational
surrogacy.77 Unlike its 2000 predecessor, the 2017 UPA imposes differing
r quirements f01· the two sur rogacy forms, with "additional safeguar ds or
r equirements on genetic surrogacy agreements," 78 as only they involve a
woman giving birth while "using her own gamete."79
IV. INTERSTATE VARIATIONS IN THE EXPANDED FORMS OF
CHILDCARE PARENTAGE LAWS

Of course, there is no need to choose between the childcare parentage
laws of two or more interested states in cases involving childcare
parentage establishment or disestablishment if all the states have
73. Id. § 609(a), (b), (d), (e).
74. Id. cmt. preceding§ 701.
75. Id. § 702.
76. Id. § 705.
77. Id. cmt. preceding§ 801.
78. Id. The com mon safeguards or requirements for all surrogacy pacts are found in
§§ 802 to 807 of he UFA.
79. Id. § 801(1). Gestatiot al E!urrogacy covers births to a woman who uso!I "gam ete;;
that are not her own." Id. § 801(2). Th special rul s fur gestational surmgacy pacts are
fo un d in §§ 808 to 812 of the UPA, wh ile t he special rules fox gen -tic sw-rogacy pacts ax
found in §§ 813 to 818.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3251452

338

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

comparable laws. Yet, notwithstanding the efforts of the NCCUSL via
their UPAs, its goals of uniform as well as sensible laws across borders,
U.S. state laws on establishing and disestablishing childcare parentage
now vary drastically. Thus, when relevant conduct occurs in two or more
states, a U.S. state court adjudicating parentage or a parent-child
relationship potentially may choose to, if not be compelled to, employ
non-forum laws. The following sections demonstrate the significant
variations in the content and application of U.S. state childcare
parentage laws dependent upon neither actual (though presumed at
times) biological ties nor formal adoptions. They demonstrate the great
potential for "true conflicts" (addressed in Section IV), as well as the
failures of many state courts to address such conflicts when they arise
(addressed in Section V).

A. Spousal Parentage
Spousal parentage laws, sometimes involving presumptions of
biological ties, are recognized in each UPA. Marriages may be actual or
attempted. 80 Where places of birth, pregnancy, and conception differ,
there may need to be a choice of law if spousal parentage under the law
can arise under any of these norms. 81 Thus, a marriage "at conception"
norm can prompt different results than a marriage "at birth" norm.s2
Where conflicting spousal parentage laws are based on the place of birth
or of pregnancy residence, if not the place of conception, the chances for
conflicting governmental interests in declaring parentage at birth arise.
However, true conflicts on initial spousal parentage are infrequent as
multistate prebirth and at-birth activities typically do not occur. Conduct
around the time of birth involving, for example, an existing marriage, the
circumstances of conception, an attempted marriage, and a marital
residence normally occur in a single state. More likely to arise are
80. See id. § 204; UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2000); UNIF.
4(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1973).

PARJ,;NTAGE ACT§

81. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-814(a)(l) (LexisNexis 2018) (presuming father with
marriage to birth mother at "any time in the ten months immediately preceding the birth");
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (Deering 201 ) (presuming husband is natural father of child born
to his wife "during the marriage, or within 300 days after the marriage is terminated");
MICH. COMP. LA ws § 722.14.33(e) (2018) (defining "presumed father" with mar1;age t.o birth
molher at th · time of the child's conception or birth); see also State v. E.KB., 35 P.3d 1224,
1229 (Wyo. 2001) (containing facts where the birth mother was married to two different
men during her pregnancy, who each qualified as presumed marital fathers under state
law).
82. ee, e.g., Debra H. v. J anice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 195 (N.Y. 2010) (determining that
civil union at time of birth wr~s k y, even though there was no civil union at the tin1e of
conception).
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conflicting U.S. state interests in the standards on overcoming (as by
rebutting or disestablishing) spousal parentage, when a court in one
state must assess any continuing childcare interests arising from a
marriage (or marital-like relationship) occurring in another state.
State laws on spousal parentage vary significantly. Today, a man in
California "is presumed to be the natural [father] of a child" if
(a) [he] and the child's natural mother are or have been married to
each other and the child is born during the marriage, or within 300
days after the marriage is terminated . . . or after a judgment of
separation is entered by a court; (b) [b]efore the child's birth, [he] and
the child's natural mother ... attempted to marry each other ...
although the attempted marriage is ... invalid, and either ... the child
is born during the attempted marriage, or within 300 days after its
termination; (c) [a]fter the child's birth, [he] and the child's natural
mother have married ... and either ... [w]ith his ... consent, [he] is
named as th.e child's parent on the child's birth certificate ... [or he]
is obligated to support the child under a written voluntary promise or
by court order. 83

As well, though it is said that in California "the child of a wife
cohabitating with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is
conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage," 84 this presumption
can now be rebutted in California with "evidence based on blood tests,"
at which time "the question of paternity of the husband shall be resolved
accordingly." 86 One case where such a question was "resolved
accordingly" was In re Jesusa v.,ss wherein the California Supreme Court
designated as the legal father the husband Paul, a presumed natural
father, rather than Heriberto, the actual natural father. 87 In doing so, it
implicitly recognized that at times (with differing facts), an unwed
biological father would prevail over a husband's presumed marital
fatherhood.as An unwed biological father in California faces differing
disestablishment norms in California where the husband, with no

83. CAL. FAM. CODE§ 7611(a)-(c) (Deering 2018).
84. CAL. FAM. CODE§ 7540 (Deering 2018); see also In re M.R., 212 Cal. Rptr. 3d 807,
819 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017) (reading § 7540 as requiring marriage both at the time of
conception and birth).
85. CAL. FAM. CODE§ 7541(a) (Deering 2018); see also K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 406
(Ind. 1996) (allowing putative father to seek to establish paternity though child was born
into a marriage and remains living with that marital family).
86. 85 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004).
87. Id. at 6.
88. See id. at 11.
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marital parentage presumption due to no cohabjtation, nevertheless was
a preswned parent as he held out his wife's child a his own.so
Outside of California, a marital parentage p esumption can be subject
to different establishment or rebuttal standards. In Michigan, parentage
arises for one married to he child's mother at the time of the child's
conception or bii-th. 90 In Utah, the standards fo1· re-butting a marital
parentage px sllmption dictate that only the mother or h r husband, the
presum d father when th• child is born during the marriage, can
challenge the marital paternity presumption so long as the couple is
"committed to remaining married" and to raising "the child as is.c,ue of
the marriage."9t Somewhat compai-ably, in Oregon only a wife or
husband can challenge the husband's presumed marital parentage 'as
long as [the husband and wife] are married and are cohabitating, unless
[the husband and wife] onsent to the challenge" by a thii-d party.92
In the 1999 decision Strauser u. Stahr,9a a Pennsylvania court held
that there is an irrebuttable presumption of paternity based upon
marriage as long as th marriage is intact, there was an intact family at
all times and th married couple favors maintaining the presumption.94
The case involved the legal paternity of Amanda Stahr, the third child
born to AprH and Steven Stahr dm·ing then- marriage. The Staru.·s always
resided together and nevei· separated. April Stahr, at one time,
recognized that 'I'imothy Strauser, not her husband, was Amanda's
biological father. She allowed Timothy frequent visits with Amanda, as
89. See, e.g., fo re Emma B., 193 al. Rptr. 3d 154, 166 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015). No
biological father was involved; husb!l.Ild was a presumed parant under CA1,. FAM. CODE
§ 7611, and not a presumed marital parent under CAL. FAM. CODE§ 7540.Jd. at 168 n.2.
90. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.1133(e) (2018); see also ARIZ. R EV. STA'r. § 26-814(a)(l)
(LexisNexis 2018) (presuming husband is the fathe1· if married to birth mother "1,1t any timB
in. he ten months immediately preceding the birth").
91. UTAH CODE ANN .§ 78B-15·607(1) (LexisNexis 2018); R.P. v. K.S.W., 320 P.3d 1084,
1088, 1093, 1099 (Utah t. i\J)p. 2014) (r viewing thfl ,>.ITects of 2005 legislation nnd finding
it pl'eempted any common law theories unwed .fat.hers might utiliui, while noting ''no
onstitu tional challenge" had been pr ·1mted); see also Kielkowski v. Kielkowski, 346 P.3d
690, 692 (Utah t. A.p·p. 2015) (d tennining marital pt'esumption was not rebutted though
the default divorce contained husband's statement. in automated divorce filing that there
were "no children Ill iasu in th.is marriage").
92. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.070(2) (2018).
93. 726 A.2d 1052 (Pa. 1999).
94. ld. at 1065-56· r,f K.E.M. v. P . . '., 38 A.3d 798, 1 (Pa. 2012) (holding tha t a
mothor can Slte the biological father for support where the child was born in.to he.r marr)nge;
she is noL estopped by her own or her husbflnd's actions at birth and thereafter because the
best inter sts of the child. would not be served by stoppel); -S.S. & R.S. v. T.M., 782 A.2d
1031, 1D37 (Pa. Super. 2001) (allowing- bi logical father to sue for custody where mother
and husband had separated fr m tim·e of conception to well after birth, during which time
bi.ological [athei: pai;ent d the chi.Id).
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voluntary blood tests showed a high probability that Timothy was the
biological father. After April began to interfer e with his visita tion with
Amai1.da, Timothy sued in paternity for childcare opportunities. April's
husband, Steven, intervened, requesting that the paternity suit be
dismissed because of the presumption that he was Amanda's father. 95
In a 4-3 decision, the Pennsylvania high court dismissed the unwed
biological fath r's pat mity suit.11 6 The court found the marital
presumpti on ("one of th e strongest pr sump tions known to the law")
could only be r ebu tted by p1·oof of the husband's sterility or lack of access
to his wife during the period of conception, at least where "the marriage
into which Amanda was born continues" (and, perhaps, where there has
never been any legal separation of the spouses). 97 This standard was said
to insure that "marriages which function as family units should not be
destroyed by disputes over the parentage of children conceived or born
during the marriage." 98 The court did not investigate Timothy's assertion
that there was truly "no marriage to protect" since the union between
April and Steven lacked "love and intimacy" and had prompted April's
adultery, which caused Steven to exhibit an "attitude of indiffernnce"
toward Amanda.99 The court also did not investigate whether "it would
be in the child's best interests" for Timothy to be granted some childcare
rights. 10 0 Two dissent ers opined that the ma1·ital presumption "should be
open to rebuttal by reliable blood test evidence." 101 Another dissenter

95. Strauser, 726 A.2d at 1052-53.
96. Id. at 1053.
97. Id. at 1053-55. A husband who is not biologically tied cannot always himself
chall nge a marital paternity presumption . ICE.M., 38 A.3d at 799-800 (allowing 'the
common law doctrine of paternity by est.oppel to bar husband's denial of pa ternity where
the bar will serve the child's best interests); see also R.K.J. v. S.P.K., 77 A.3d 33, 42 (Pa.
Super. 2013) (using paternity by estoppel to support a child support order against a
.
non-biological father who acted like a father for six years).
98. Strauser, 726 A.2d at 1054 (quoting Brinkley v. King, 701 A.2d 176, 180 (Pa. 1997)).
99. Id. at 1055-56.
100. Id. at 1053. Similar norms operate in Alabama. See, e.g., B.C. v. J .S.U., 158 So. 3d
464 , 467 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014) (quoting Ex parte S.E., 125 So. 3d 720, 721 (Ala. Civ. App.
2013) (determining th a-t pu tative biological father cannot challenge marital pru· ntage
pres umption where presumed parent "wishes to persist" in parentage under law)); cf Pena
v. Diaz, 125 S . 3tl 356, 359 (Fla. App. 6th 2013) (Griffin, J ., specially copcurri ng) (noLi.l lg
"in tact" mal."riage rule operates in Florida, but finding, contrary to other ll'lor ida judges, it
is ina pplicable when divorce action was p nding when chlld was born into marriage, even
if tlivorce case is later voluntar ily dismissed); C. G. v. J .R., 130 So. 3d 776, 782 (Fla. App.
2014) (denying biological fa t her standi ng to upset hu ·band's paternity; no support in
Florida law for "two legally recognized fsthers" for childcare purposes where the married
couple only separated a few years after the child's birth).
101. Strauser, 726 A.2d at 1057 (Newman, J ., dissenting).
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welcomed blood tests as well as a "case-by-case" analysis on "what is best
for Amanda." 102
In Illinois, there are different marital parentage presumption and
rebuttal standards. The Illinois Parentage Act103 creates a few parentage
presumptions founded on marriage and marital-like relationships. One
is that a person is presumed to be the parent of a child "born to the
mother during .. . marriage . . . or [a] substantially similar legal
relationship." 104 The marital and marital-like parentage presumption in
Illinois is not conclusive, as it may be challenged in a proceeding to
adjudicate the parentage of a child.t05 A challenge seeking to disestablish
a marital parentage presumption may be brought by a presumed parent,
acknowledged parent, adjudicated parent, or alleged parent, as well as
by the child. 106 A challenge may be foreclosed, however, due to the earlier
conduct of the challenger, inequity, or the child's best interests.107
Disestablishments by unwed biological fathers of the marital
parentage in other men ai·e easier in Missis sippi. The Mississippi
Supreme Court has recognized a s t1·ong parental presumption for thos
biologically connected. tOB In one case a child was born in 2004 into the
2004 marriage of Amy and Scott, who were divorced in 2009.109 T.J., the
child's biological father who first learned of his genetic ties in 2011, sued
for custody in 2011. 110 While T.J., for quite some time, "did little to
nothing to inquire or otherwise try to involve himself in the life of a child

102. Id. at 1056, 1057 (Nigro, J ., dissenting).
103. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 46/101-977 (2018).
104. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 46/204(a)(l) (2018). Except as provided by a valid gestational
surrogacy contract or other law. Id.
105. 750 ILL. CO.MJ>. S'rA'r . 46J610(a) (2018) (covering other challenges to, for example,
acknowledged and adjudicated parents).
lOR. Id. Where the challenger was earlier involved in a lawsuit in which a presumed
parent wa.s deemed an adjudicated pa rent, a challenge may be foreclosed. See, e.g., In re
Griesmeyer, 707 N.E.2d 72, 79 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (dismissing par ntage petition due t.o
earlier dissolution proceeding, where both mother and child were parties and where there
wall a n "uncontested judgme nt" declaring child was "born as a result of ft he] marriage")· cf.
Simcox v. Simcox, 546 N.E.2d 609, 611 (Ill. 1989) (determining, as child was not a party to
earlier dissolu tion proc eding, no preclusive effects as to child). Outside of Illinois ther is,
for example, Myers u. Myers, 13 N.E. 3d 478, 483-84 (lnd. App. 2014) (baning ex-wife hy
]aches from challenging ex- hus ba nd's paternity since earlier dissolu tion case de med
ex-husband the legal father though it recognized there were no biological ties).
107. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 46/610(a)(1)~(3) (20 1.8); see also Buchanan v. '.Legan, 92
N.E.3d 600, 604 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017) (for closing child's action t.o esla blish fath ·hood in
biological dad due to failed earlier attempt where there was a presumed marital father) .
108. E.g., In re Waites, 152 So. 3d 306, 310 (Miss. 2014).
109. Id. at 307-08.
110. Id. at 308.
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that could have been his,"ll 1 he nevertheless was found entitled to the
"natural-parent presumption" which could only be overcome by "clear
and convincing evidence of abandonment, desertion, immoral conduct
detrimental to the child, [or] unfitness."11 2 By contrast, in Louisiana,
barring maternal "bad faith," a biological father cannot seek to undo a
marital paternity presumption one year after the child is born. 11 3
Disestablishment norms for spousal parentage presumptions not only
vary interstate, but also can vary intrastate. Thus, in Louisiana, an
unwed biological father has only one year from birth to seek
disestablishment while the birth mother has two years from birth. 114
Further, spousal parentage norms can vary for purposes beyond child
custody or visitation. Whatever the circumstances allowing
establishment or rebuttal of spousal parentage, once rebutted, at least by
the marital parent, the disestablished parent usually will no longer have
child support duties.115 Yet, may such a disestablished parent recover any
earlier support, or perhaps other monies tied to the one-time parenthood?
In 2012, the Tennessee Supreme Court allowed a man who rebutted, as
of April 2009, his marital parentage earlier recognized in a February
2001 dissolution decree, to recover--on an intentional misrepresentation
of facts claim against his ex-wife-the child support, medical expenses,
and insurance premiums he had paid on the child's behalf following the
dissolution.116 Elsewhere, as in West Virginia, there is a differing
assessment of damages or culpability.117
It should be noted that even when spousal parentage is established
and then rebutted or subject to rebuttal, the spousal parent (current or
former) may still have avenues to childcare. Thus, in a 1996 New
Hampshire case, a husband who lost his presumptive parenthood became
a stepfather, as he remained married to the birth mother.ll 8 In that state,

111. Id.
112. Id. at 314.
113. L.J.D. v. M.V.S., 212 So. 3d 581, 584 (La. Ct. App. 2017). Even if filed within a year,
res judicata can bar a challenge. State v. Jim, 162 So. 3d 1270, 1273 (La. Ct. App. 2015)
(prohibiting man from challenging his paternity when he earlier was adjudged the father
in a paternity suit seeking child support).
114. Leger v. Leger, No. 17-270, 2017 La. App. LEXIS 2264, at *4-5 (La. Ct. App. Dec.
6, 2017).
115. Price v. Price, No. W2012-01501-COA-R3-CV, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 263, at *910 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2013) (unless the husband is a legal father by other means, like
a voluntary parentage acknowledgment).
116. Hodge v. Craig, 382 S.W.3d 325, 329 (Tenn. 2012).
117. See, e.g., Kessel v. Leavitt, 511 S.E.2d 720, 816-17 (W. Va. 1998) (allowing no claim
against mother, however).
118. Bodwell v. Brooks, 686 A.2d 1179, 1182 (N.H. 1996).
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a stepparent can be granted child custody if it serves the child's best
interest, as long as the stepparent acts in loco parentis by admitting the
child into the family and treating the child as a family member. 119 The
Missouri high court in 2018 allowed a disestablished spousal parent to
pursue a nonparent childcare order after the biological father joined a
pending divorce case.1 20 In some states, a marital parent-whose status
is more easily rebutted by a lack of biological ties-can sign a V AP,
though not biologically tied, prompting childcare parentage, 121 making
an effort to disestablish childcare parentage more difficult.
So, there are many interstate differences in spousal parentage. Some
were prompted by the differences in the UPAs. When marital families
wholly or partially move across U.S. state borders, and childcare
parentage issues then arise, choice of law issues can emerge.122
119. Id. at 1183.
120. Bowers v. Bowers, 543 S.W.3d 608, 617 (Mo. 2018).
121. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, §§ 301, 401 (2018) (allowing "presumed parent,"
which includes spouse of birth mother, to sign an acknowledgment of parentage).
122. Incidentally, beyond childcare, spousal parentage presumptions can vary
interstate in other settings. Two Florida cases illustrate this point. The issue in the cases
was whether a deceased man's biological son was his survivor under the state Wrongful
Death Act where the son's mother was married to another man at the time of the son's birth
and where the husband's presumptive parentage had never been, and would likely never
be, rebutted. The cases differ in result. In Daniels v. Greenfield, 15 So. 3d 908 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2009), approved & remanded for hearing, 51 So. 3d 421 (Fla. 2010), the court found
the son was a survivor, especially as the decedent was listed as the father on the birth
certificate and was the only father known to the child. Daniels, 15 So. 3d at 914. In 2001,
another appeals court, in Achumba v. Neustein, 793 So. 2d 1013 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)
disapproved in Greenfield v. Daniels, 51 So. 3d at 422, the court found no survivorship, at
least where the husband's name was on the child's birth certificate. Achumba, 793 So. 2d
at 1014. Of course, here there is typically less potential harm to an intact family. And here,
one family will benefit financially by the legal recognition of a second father, with likely
financial detriment to another family.
The financial detriment to other family members of a decedent who is labeled a
presumptive parent has led to some lawsuits wherein those family members seek to
disestablish a marital presumption favoring the child of the decedent. In a 2006 Minnesota
Supreme Court probate case involving a decedent's heirs, the decedent's daughter sought
to disestablish the decedent's son (then her brother) via a marital paternity presumption
by proving the decedent had no biological ties to his presumed son, born in the late 1940s.
In re Estate of Jotham, 722 N.W.2d 447, 450 (Minn. 2006). The daughter lost, but only
because the Parentage Act required an action "declaring the nonexistence of the father and
child relationship presumed" be brought no later than three years after the child's birth.
Id. (employing MINN. STAT. § 257.55 (2018)). A daughter also may not have had standing
to seek disestablishment within three years as the Parentage Act granted standing to a
child, the child's biological mother, or a man presumed to be the child's father, meaning the
daughter might only be able to knock out her brother's recovery from the estate if her
mother sued). Had the decedent died earlier, the sister's attempt to disestablish the
parentage of her father as to her then brother might have been successful. Elsewhere, the
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B. Voluntary Parentage Acknowledgment
State VAP statutes can also, but need not, involve parentage
presumptions. With and without pr sumptions,123 VAP statutes on
parentage establishment typically recognize Lbat signed and state-filed
parentage declarations can establish childcare parentage for the signors,
having the force and effect of court judgment .12,t Signors ar sometimes
without alleged biological ties and do not undertak formal adoptions.
V AP laws vary whether there is an express requirement of possibl
biological ti s. As w ll, V AP laws a · subject to differing
disestablishment standards, though all norms, due to federal welfare
subsidy mandates, must conform to c r ain fed ,1·al Social Security Act ui5
r· quisites. 126 VAP statutes usually ar employ d by birth mothers and
unwed men, with or without biological ties to ·bildre\1 born of sex, who

iste:r would be barred by a lar:k of standing to challeng the presumption. S e, e.g., Zn r
Es tate of Lamey, 689 N.E.2d 1265, 1270 (Jnd. Ct. App. 1997) (prohibiting unclB from
challenging paternity of his brother's daught r for purposes of determining hefrship in his
brother's estate).
Marital paternity presumptions can also be rebutted in child support reimbursem.en
settings where husbands, once presumed fathers, seek reimbursement from biological
fathers. In 2012, the New J ersey Supreme Court recognized s uch a former husband's claim
against-the biological father, his former brother-in-law, whet·e t.he child was nineteen. D.W.
v. R.W., 52 A.3d 1043, 1045 (N..f. 2012). A statute recognized such a claim and ther was
no s howing of good cause for not requiring genetic testing_ ld. Seemingly, good cause might
wall bar a court order on g netic testing in a reimbursement setting where the child was
nine, and not nineteen, years old and where the relevant ma.rriage remained intact.
123.
mpwe, e.g., MON'!'. CODE ANN. § 4-0-6- 105(5)(c) (2017) ("irrehuttable
p1·esumption") and CAL. FAM. CODE § 7573 (West 2018) (establishment of paternity) with
N w York Family ourt Act, N.Y. CLS Family Ct. Act§ 516-a(a) (2018) (establishment).
taL voluntary acknowledgment statutes are reviewed in Jeffrey Parness aad Zach
Townsend, For Thos NoL John Edwards: More and Better Paternity Aclmowl •({gm,ent.s at
Birth, 40 0. HALT. L_ REV. 3, 63-87 (2010) and Juyuu Mor
Cacioppo, Volwilary
!\cluwwledgme:n.ts of Pa.ternity: Should Biology Play a &le in Dete,.,nining Who a .11 Be a
Legal Father?, 38 lNO. L. REV. 479 (2005).
124. Stale statute on the effects ofVAPs vary in their language though ~·deral law (tied
to st.al participation in TANF, a fodera 1 wclfa.re subsidy program) requires that, VAPs from
ot.her states 'b given "full faith and ti· dit." 42 U.S.C. § 666(a) 5)(c)(iv) (2018).
125. Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as 42 U.S.C. ch. 7).
l26. Personal Responsibility & Work Opportunity ReconciJiation Act of L996. Pub. L.
No. J.04-193, l LO Stut. 2105 (codified in. scatt red section.a Q( 42 U .. C.). Oise tablishro ent
(namely, rescisslons a11d challenges) noi:ms are reviewed in Puula Roberts, Truth an.cl
'01u;equen.ces: Part l. Disestablishing the Paternity of Non-Maritcd hildrer,, 37 FAM . l,.Q.
35, 44-53 (2003).
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seek to establish legal paternity. 127 Increasingly though, VAP
establishments can be undertaken by birth mothers and other women.
VAP statutes on parentage disestablishment via VAP challenges often
are used by one or both of the signatories (like the birth mother or
putative father). Further, others sometimes employ them, like the state
or a non-signing man with actual biological ties to the child. 12 8 VAPs are
typically distinguished from birth certificate recognitions of childcare
parents encompassing those married to birth mothers who never
undertake VAPs. 129 Thus, in Alaska and Nevada the forms do not speak
to biological ties, with the signing man indicating only that he is the
"father."130 In Wyoming and Washington, there is no explicit req11irement
for the signing man to affirm a belief in biological ties, though the signor
elsewhere is referred to as the "natural father."131
Only in some places can a VAP be returned prior to birth. 132
Additionally, only in some places must information as to any completed
genetic testing be submitted; may forms be used by residents for
out-of-state births; are witnesses or notaries needed; and must forms
require parental or guardian consent when the signing mothers are
young.133
Further, notwithstanding any designated "conclusive" status,
voluntary acknowledgments usually may be rescinded within sixty
days.134 After sixty days, however, VAPs usually may only be challenged
in court on the basis of "fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact,"

127. But see In re Adoption of Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d 677, 692-93 (2009) (suggesting
woman whose ova was used by her partner to bear a child born of assisted reproduction
might employ the voluntary acknowledgment process).
128. See, e.g., Parness & Townsend, supra note 123, at 82-86.
129. See, e.g., Castillo v. Lazo, 386 P.3d 839, 842 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016) (holding birth
certificate naming husband is not "equivalent" to a VAP).
130. Alaska Bureau of Vital Stat., Form No. 06-5376 VS Form 16, Affidavit of Paternity
(rev. Jan. 2009); Nevada Declaration of Paternity, Nevada Vital Records, Form No. NSPO,
Declaration of Paternity (rev. July 2008). These and other cited forms, were collected for
Parness & Townsend, supra note 123, and are on file with the Author.
131. Vital Records Servs., State of Wyoming, Affidavit Acknowledging Paternity and
Washington Paternity Affidavit, Ctr. For Health Stat., Wash. Dep't of Health, Form No.
DOH/CHS 021 (rev. Sept. 2007). See generally Cacioppo, supra note 123, at 489-91.
132. See, e.g., Texas Acknowledgment of Paternity, Vital Stat. Unit, Texas Dep't of State
Health Servs., Form No. VS-159-lM (rev. Sept. 2005).
133. The varying state forms are reviewed in Parness & Townsend, supra note 123, at
63-87.
134. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(D)(ii) (2018).
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standards prompted by the federal Social Security Act.135 The following
cases demonstrate significant interstate variations on such VAP
challenges,136 notwithstanding the federal standards.
A Connecticut superior court, in Thompson u. Fulse, 137 ruled on a
motion by a male voluntary parentage acknowledger to reopen a
December 1989 Connecticut court judgment. 138 That judgment was based
on a voluntary acknowledgment signed in Florida by the male, Willie
Fulse, in October 1989, about seven months after the birth of Rishawn
Fulse to Andrea Thompson in Connecticut. 139 As to fraud, the court held
that a challenger must prove the following:
·
(1) a false representation was made as a statement of fact;

(2) it was untrue and known to be untrue by the party making it;
(3) it was made to induce the other party to act upon it; and
(4) the other party did so act upon the false representation to his
detriment.140

Willie was unable to show fraud because Andrea did not
"intentionally" keep her sexual liaisons with Trevor, her former
boyfriend, from Willie. 141 While pregnant, Andrea did tell Willie he was
the father. Around March 1990, Willie learned from Andrea that he "was
not Rishawn's father." 142 Willie did not challenge the VAP because he
thought "the matter had been taken care of' by Andrea.1 43 Willie only
realized the acknowledgment continued in effect in April 2003, when he
was served with papers to appear in a Connecticut child support
proceeding, seemingly prompted by Andrea's receipt of state assistance
in Connecticut. The state wanted reimbursement of the state aid from
Willie. Before then, Willie "had some minimal contact" with Rishawn, but
135. Id. § 666(a)(5}{D)(iii). At least one state statute combines its norms on
disestablishing presumed marital paternity and its norms on challenging VAPs. ALA. CODE
§ 26-17-608(a){l) {2018).
136. On the variations and suggested reforms, see Jeffrey A. Parness & David A. Saxe,
Reforming the Processes for Challenging Voluntary Acknowledgments of Paternity, 92
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 177 (2017) .
137. No. FA890605982S, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1936, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. July
7, 2004).
138. Id. at *15.
139. Id. at* 1.
140. Id. at *7.
141. Id. at *8.
142. Id. at *2.
143. Id. at *4.
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had never been asked by Andrea for child support. 144 While Willie failed
to prove fraud, the trial court said he might still disestablish his VAP
parentage due to a material mistake of fact. 145 In this "unique" setting,
the court found Willie's arguments "slightly more persuasive,
particularly from Rishawn's point of view" as the child might be helped
"from a medical history standpoint" if Trevor was named the legal
father. 146 The trial court retained jurisdiction and ordered genetic testing
of Andrea, Willie, and Rishawn. 147 Here, a mistake as to biological ties
seemingly sufficed for a successful V AP challenge.
An Oklahoma appellate court ruled in 2004 on a VAP challenge by
Billy J. Chisum, who sought disestablishment of a VAP signed on the
date of the child's birth in June 1999. 148 The acknowledgment was used
in a 2000 administrative child support order. The challenge came in April
2001 after Billy had private testing done that was prompted by the
mother's statement that Billy was not the father. 149 The appellate court
held there was a "material mistake of fact" even though Billy could have
insisted on biological testing before his acknowledgment. 1so It held no
"neglect" by Billy d~to his failure to seek testing earlier. 151 It reasoned
that any testing at birth would "likely" have injected "an element of
hostility into ... already volatile emotional relationships," would have
been "expensive," and may have prompted unfortunate perceptions about
"an attack on the mother's veracity and an attempt to shirk responsibility
for the child." 15 2 The court rejected arguments about the applicability of
a best-interests-of-the-child test, or of an equitable estoppel analysis.153
Again, mistake as to biological ties sufficed for a successful VAP
challenge, with an accompanying rationale that is sensible. Yet here,
unlike in Fulse, there was little talk of helping the child.
In Rousseve v. Jones,154 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that an
acknowledgment of an illegitimate child only creates a presumption of
biological parentage that can be overridden whenever biological ties are
lacking, "absent some overriding concern of public policy." 155 The court in
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at *5.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *14-15.
Id. at *16.
Dep't of Human Servs. v. Chisum, 85 P .3d 860 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004).
Id. at 861.
Id. at 862.
Id.
Id. at 862 n.2.
Id. at 863 n.3.
704 So. 2d 229 (La. 1997).
Id. at 233.
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Rousseve recognized, however, that when a VAP forms the basis of a court
judgment for child support, Louisirurn law expressly allowed an attack on
the judgment only if it was procured "by fraud or ill practice" and only if
it was brought within a year of discovery of the fraud or ill practice. J5G By
contrast, the court not d that an action to disavow th pat -rruty of a child
by a man who was at some time the husband of the moth r "gen rally
must be filed within 180 days after the husband has lea rn ed or should
have learned of the birth of the child." 157 Yet, where such a husband
"erroneously believed, b cause of misi:epr s ntation, fraud, or deception
by the mother, that he was the father of the child then th time for filing
suit for disavowal of paternity shall be sus pend d dming the period of
such erroneous belief or for ten years, whichever ends first." tPB
Because unwed Matthew Rousseve had not ye proven his allegatio~s
"that he had just become aware of fraud or misr pres ntation by the
child's mother1'J. 69 when he sought a pat niity disavowal involving a court
judgment founded on his VAP the high court remanded the cas for an
additional hearing. 160 Clearly, because Matthew had never been married
to the mother, he had mor time to "sit n" hi newfound discovery of
non-patm.·nity (one year) than a married man would have had (180 days),
but far less time to e cape a patemity court judgment bas don a VAP
than an acknowledged father would have had to undo a VAP that was
unaccompanied by a cotrrt ordel·. In Louisiana, mis akes on biological ties
are sufficient for VAP challenges, but not for paternity judgment
disestablishments wh re 'fraud or ill practice" must be shown. As well,
mistakes are insufficient for marital p1·es umption disestablishments
whe1·e, after 180 days, "the mother's fraud, misrepresentation or
deception" must be shown.1s1
In Indiana, some p1·ecedents mainta:in that a male VAP signatory can
challenge his parentage only "in extreme and rare instances" where the
evidence of a lack of biological ties "has become 'availabl ·ndependently
of court action. "1 62 This has been read to mean that the evidence of no
ties "was not actively sought by the putative father, but was discovered
almost inadvert ntly in a manner that was unrelated to child support

166. Id.
167. Id. at 231 n.4.
158. Id. at 231.
159. Id. at 230.
160. Id. at 234.
161. Id. at 233.
162. In re Paternity of E.M.L.G., 863 N.E.2d 867, 870 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting
Fairrow v. Fairrow, 559 N.E.2d 597, 600 (Ind. 1990)).
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proceedings."163 Inadvertent discovery can occur when the putative
father receives "ordinary medical care," but not when he is told by the
child that he may not be the biological father. 164 Yet other precedents
make disestablishment of a "paternity affidavit" easier.165
Finally, in Michigan, a post-sixty-day challenge to a VAP requires not
only fraud, duress, or mistake, but also a child's best interest analysis.
Such a proceeding is treated like a request to set aside a paternity
determination.166
The foregoing cases illustrate only some of the many differences
between state laws on how fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact may
be used to undo VAPs. 167 The cases raise difficult policy questions. Is
there a certain time within which one can challenge a VAP regardless of
the reason, or should there be no absolute time limit? Is there u~ually a
"material mistake" whenever an acknowledging person, who must be
genetically-tied, is wrong about biological ties, though there is no
fraud? 168 Must any "material mistake of fact" be "mutual?"t69 Can a
concern for justice, or a child's best interests, bar a signing person's
challenge even though fraud, duress, or mistake is proven?t7o How should
a state welfare agency's interests in welfare payment reimbursements
from non-signing biological fathers be considered when determining VAP
challenges? The absence of more explicit federal guidelines allows the
noted interstate differences. Further, this absence is sometimes coupled
163. Tirey v. Tirey, 806 N.E.2d 360, 362 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
164. In re Paternity of B.M., 93 N.E.3d 1132, 1137 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) .
165. See, e.g., In re Paternity of I.LP., 92 N.E.3d 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (including a
strong dissent urging that judicial action on disestablishment violates the statutory norms
on VAPs, which follow the federal Social Security Act).
166. Helton v. Beaman, 861 N.W.2d 621 (Mich. 2015).
167. State statutes on rescinding or challenging voluntary paternity acknowledgments
are collected and summarized in Roberts, supra note 126, at 82-90; see also Leslie Joan
Harris, Reforming Paternity Law to Eliminate Gender, Status and Class Inequality, 2013
MICH. ST. L. REV. 1295 (2013) (suggesting rescission reforms for voluntary parentage
acknowledgments); Parness & Saxe, supra note 136, at 185-205 (varying state VAP
challenge laws); Caroline Ragus, Fighting the Establishment: The Need for Procedural
Reform of Our Paternity Laws, 21 MICH . J . GENDER & L. 67 (2014) (suggesting reforms
easing burdens on those seeking rescissions of voluntary parentage acknowledgments).
168. See, e.g., Rogers v. Weisel, 877 N.W.2d 169, 178 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015) (signing man
can have some doubt as to biological ties but still be mistaken and thus eligible to rescind).
169. See, e.g., Gordon v. Hedrick, 364 P.3d 951, 954 (Idaho 2015) (holding yes); see also
State v. Smith, 392 P.3d 68, 79 (Kan. 2017) (allowing no VAP challenge when both signors
knew signing man was not the biological father).
170. Flores v. Sanchez, 137 So. 3d 1104, 1111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (holding best
interests test must be met before testing ordered on behalf of a mother that might result in
a rescission of a voluntary paternity acknowledgement by a non-biological father who raised
the child for four years).
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with state general assembly inaction, leaving those within a single state
to wonder how VAP challenge processes operate. 171
Beyond the variations in the state procedures available to
non-biological acknowledging fathers seeking to challenge their VAPs,
there are also interstate differences on when and how others (including,
but not limited to, signing mothers) can contest such earlier
acknowledgments. By federal statute, "any signatory" has a right to
rescind a voluntary acknowledgment within sixty days. 172 Thereafter,
states participating in the federal TANF program "must have in effect
laws" allowing a post-sixty-day "contest" of a signed voluntary
acknowledgment where the "challenger" must show "fraud, duress, or
material mistake of fact" and where the legal responsibilities of any
signatory usually continue "during the challenge." 1 73 Does this federal
law require fraud and the like only of signatories who contest after sixty
days, or must anyone who 'c hallenges meet these requirements? Who is a
"challenger?" Can others besides acknowledging fathers even challenge?
Federal statutes speak of both a "signatory" and a "challenger." At least
in Indiana, "[T]here is no provision ... that would permit [the] Mother to
attempt to rescind the paternity affidavit." 174 Of course, allowing
non-signatories to challenge, even where there are no marriages, would
often disrupt intact families. Nevertheless, in Alabama, a statute
provides that for a child with an acknowledged father, a non-signatory
can seek an adjudication of paternity "if the court determines that it is in
the best interest of the child."175
If a chj.ld challenges a VAP (for example, in order to establish legal
parentage in the real biological father), it may be difficult to ask the child
to prove fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact since any such acts
occurred, if at all, by or to another. When a mother has custody of an
acknowledged child, might she be able to challenge a VAP on the child's
behalf when she herself could not challenge due to her own fraud? While
her own challenge may be estopped because of her own conduct (for
example, deceiving a man as to his biological ties while allowing him to
develop a loving parental relationship with her child), the child may not
be assessed responsibility for such maternal conduct.
171. See, for example, the problems posed for the Vermont Supreme Court Justices in
McGee v. Gonyo, 140 A3d 162, 169, 178 (Vt. 2016) (Dooley, J., concurring and Robinson, J .,
dissenting) (including several justices' call for legislative reforms).
172. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(D)(ii).
173. Id. § 666(a)(5)(D)(iii) (providing temporary assistance for needy families).
174. A.G.P.M.O. v. R.K.P., 13 N.E.3d 554 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (including facts where the
mother was also denied rescission authority as she "cannot take advantage of the fraud she
herself perpetuated on the court").
175. ALA. CODE§ 26-l 7-609(b) (2018).
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Further, if an alleged unwed biological father is allowed to challenge
another man's VAP (for example, to establish his own childcare
parentage), would only fraud personal to him (if fraud is even required)
be sufficient? Or could an alleged unwed biological father rely on the
fraud committed against the acknowledging father by the mother, or on
the fraud perpetrated on the government by each of the two signatories?
In one, quite sensible, ruling, a biological father was found able to contest
a VAP signed by another man in order to avoid the formal adoption
process, though the contesting father may not always prevail,176 In
addition, what about allowing challenges to VAPs by state welfare
agencies looking to recover child support expenditures from "deadbeat"
dads, or looking to protect children from abuse or neglect by an
acknowledging man via a VAP challenge rather than via ari· abuse or
neglect petition?l77
Answers to these and other questions on VAP challenges after sixty
days will come from state laws as long as federal lawmakers are silent.
As noted, there is some diversity of approach in the state requirements
for VAP challenges, as with the norms on fraud, duress, and mistake.
Further illustrations of interstate variations on VAPs follow,
demonstrating additional chances for "true conflicts" to arise in court
proceedings involving VAPs where relevant human conduct occurred in
two or more U.S. states.
On challenges by non-signatories to voluntary paternity
acknowledgments, there are some written state laws. In Arizona, "the
mother, father or child," as well as the state, seemingly may challenge a
VAP (which earlier was used to prompt a court order) after the sixty-day
period only on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact. 178
In Virginia, fraud and the like are required of "the person challenging"
the voluntary statement acknowledging paternity. 179 In Wisconsin, "a
determination of paternity" arising from a statement acknowledging
paternity "may be voided at any time upon a motion or petition stating
facts that show fraud, duress[,] or a mistake offact."1so In Delaware, after
sixty days "a signatory of an acknowledgment" may commence a
proceeding to challenge on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake
of fact.1s 1 In Michigan, the mother, the signing man, the child, or a
176. Alvarado v. Thompson, 375 P.3d 77, 82 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016).
177. In Illinois, the state may not pursue a rescission against an alleged abuser in a
neglect proceeding, but a child, via a guardian, may. In re N.C., 12 N.E.3d 23, 37 (Ill. 2014).
178. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-812(E) (2018).
179. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-49.1(8)(2) (2018) .
180. WIS . STAT. § 767.805(5) (2018).
181. DEL. CODE ANN . tit. 13, § 8-308(a)(l) (2018).
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prosecuting attorney may seek revocation of a parentage
acknowledgment.1s2 In Utah, after sixty days, only "a signatory" or "a
support-enforcement agency" may bring challenges.183 Finally, in
Vermont, "a person who is neither the child nor a signatory" can pursue
a VAP challenge.184
These differences in explicit state statutes on non-signatory
challengers may not prompt as much interstate variations as first
appear. In many places, though unrecognized in explicit VAP statutes,
non-signatories may challenge VAPs by civil actions, such as, seeking
declarations of the existence or nonexistence of father-child relationships
under law. 185
There are other differences in current state VAP laws. For example,
there are varied time limits on VAP challenges. Even with fraud, duress,
or mistake, challenges must be commenced under written law within a
year in Massachusetts,186 within two years in Delaware, 187 and within
four years in Texas.1ss In Utah, a statutory challenge may be made "at
any time" on the ground of fraud or duress, but only within four years for
material mistake of fact.189 Where there are no written time limits (often
quite broad), trial court discretion reigns. 19° Further, there are
differences in whether the effects of a successfully challenged VAP
include the elimination of past child support arrearages.191
182. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.1437(1) (2018).
183. UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78B-15-307(1) (2018).
184. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 308(b) (2018) (requiring that person also seek to
adjudicate parentage).
185. See, e.g., Sandoval v. Botello (In re Unknown), 951 N.E.2d 1220, 1224 (Ill. App. Ct.
2011) (holding that an alleged biological father can challenge another man's VAP via a
paternity suit seeking a childcare order).
186. MASS. GEN. LAWS § 209C(ll)(a) (West 2018); see also Smith, 392 P.3d at 76--77
(holding that a one-year, after-birth limit on signatory challenges applied even though
technical violations were found; for example, a VAP that was not properly notarized).
187. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-308(a)(2) (2018); see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C,
§ 308(a)(l) (2018); Paul v. Williamson, 322 P.3d 1070 (Okla. Civ. App. 2014) (employing
Oklahoma two-year limit against alleged biological father per OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 7700-609(B) (West 2018)); cf. LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:406 (2018) (two-year prescriptive period
previously imposed for revocation of authentic acts of acknowledgement was repealed in
2016).
188. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.§ 160.308(a) (West 2018) .
189. UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78B-15-307 (LexisNexis 2018).
190. See, e.g., In re Neal, 184 A.3d 90, 96 (N.H. 2018) (holding that the trial court's
exercise of discretion was sustainable where a 2009 VAP was challenged by male signatory
in 2015 after a 2012 paternity test revealed that he was not the biological father; challenge
was brought in November 2015, after child contact was cut off in March 2014).
191. See, e.g., Adler v. Dormio, 872 N.W.2d 721, 723-25 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015) (reviewing
Michigan laws on when responsibility for arrearages may be eliminated).
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Notwithstanding, some federal-law demands on national uniformity in
VAP establishments and disestablishments, as seen in U.S. state lawsboth statutes and judicial precedents-vary greatly. 192 Variations may
significantly diminish should U.S. state legislators enact the 2017 UPA
provisions on VAPs. Current laws often reflect the earlier model VAP
provisions in the 1973 or 2000 UPA. Should many states choose to follow
the 2017 UPA, interstate variations may lessen, but some "true conflicts"
will likely continue. One probable continuing interstate variation
involves whether "unnatural" VAPs are permitted, that is, VAPs not
necessarily dependent upon alleged or believed biological ties.

C. Residency and Hold Out Parentage
The current UPA limitation of the ''holding out" parentage
presumption to one residing with a child "for the first two years of the
[child's life]," first established in 2000, lessened considerably the
prospects of conflicting governmental interests. 193 The state of residence
on the child's second birthday should typically be key, with such
residency usually limited to a single state. While the "same household"
may be maintained for a child in several different states before the child
reaches two, only one state will usually qualify as the child's residence at
the time of the child's second birthday, the key to prompting the UPA
presumption. Yet the residency and holding out parentage norms in the
1973 UPA, which do not require residency and holding out in the first
two years, present more serious choice of law problems where
implemented.
As with spousal parentage, there are varying U.S. state laws on
parentage arising from the nonmarital acts of residency or holding out.
In California, a man is "presumed to be the natural [father] of a child" if
he "receive[d] the child into his ... home and openly holds out the child
as his . . . natural child."194 There is no explicit requirement that a
residency or hold out man have any beliefs about his actual biological
ties. California cases have in fact recognized as presumed fathers men
192. On the need for state law reforms, as well as a review of current voluntary paternity
acknowledgment processes, see Rogus, supra note 167, at 67; Harris, supra note 167, at
1295; and Parness & Saxe, supra note 136, at 185-205 (analyzing varying state laws on
VAP challenges).
193. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 204 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017).
194. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (2018). The presumption has been sustained when
challenged on the ground of interfering with federal constitutional childcare interests. See,
e.g., R.M. v. T.A., 233 Cal. App. 4th 760 (2015) (using preponderance of evidence norm to
establish presumption). As to what constitutes receipt into the home, see San Francisco
Human Services Agency u. A. V. (In re N.V.), No. A141323, 2014 Cal. App. LEXIS 8870 (Cal.
Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2014) (reviewing cases).
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who knew there were no biological ties, but who acted in the community
as if there were. For example, in In re Jesusa V., 195 both Paul (the
husband) and Heriberto (the biological father) were each judicially
declared to be "pres um d" California fathers because each had received
Jesusa into his home and held her out as his natural child.196
E]sewh ~r , Lhe requisites for nonmarital childcare parentage arising
from residen y and hold out differ. For example, some laws do not require
receipt into th home. 19 7 Som laws require hold out for a definite time
period which often must start at bn:th.198 Some laws e>..'j)licitly require
existing parents to agree to such matters as residency and hold out by
nonparents, who can later morph into new childcare parents 199 on equal
footing with xisting parents.200 Disestablishment norms for even similar
nonmarital parentage founded on residency and hold out also vary
interstat .20 1 Incidentally, wher a singl state has two distinct forms of
195. 85 P.3d 2, 14 (Cal. 2004).
196. Id. ; see also Bn'1llls v. Cypert, No. F049259, 2006 Cal. App. LEXIS 1054.3 (Cal. t.
App. Nov. 21 2006) Qlolding birth mother's uncl is a presumed parent).
197. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17,43{a)(4)-(6) (West 2018) (either receives into his
home or "p_rov1dos su pport fo.1.:. the child"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-20l(c) (20~8)
{"parental role" and "bonded and dependent relationslrip . . . that is parental in nature").
1.98. See, e.g ., TEX. FAM. COOEAN:N. § 160.204(a)(6) (2018) (deCining man as a presumed
faLher if "during the fast two years of the child's life, he continuously resided in the
household in which the child resided and he represented to others that the child was his
own"); WASH . REV.
ODE § 26.26.116(2) (2018) (similru;); cf. MONT. CODE ANN .
§ 40-6-105(l)(d) (2018) (presummg person is the natural father jf "while the child [was]
under the age of majority," the person "receives the child into the person's home and openly
represents the child to be the perso11's nat.uml child").
199. Even when the statutes only explicitly recognize hold out by men, women are often
deemed eligible to be pres umed pa.rents under these statutes. See, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff,
From 'l.'hird Parties to Parents: The Case of Lesbian Couples and Their Children, 77 L. &
CON'l'EMP. PRODS. 195, 212-19 (2014).
200. See, e.g., D. . ODE § 16·831.01(1) (2018) (addressing single parent's "agreemeni"
to same household l'esideucy for one wishing to be deemed a de facto parent); cf. N.J. S·rAT.
ANN.§ 9:l 7-43(a)(4), (5) (West 2018); N.J. S'l'A'r. ANN.§ 9:17-40 (West 2018) (allowing a man
to be presumed the biological fo.ther of a child on equal footing with the unwed birth mother,
if h e "openly holds out the child as h~a natural child" and either "receives the child into his
home" or "provides support for the child").
201. See generally Roberts, supra note 126, at 47-51. Particular differences includ
varia tions in the Lim e limits for rebutting or disestablishing residency/hold out parentage.
Compare, e.g., AI.A. ODE § 26-17-204(a)(5), (b) (LexisNexis 2018), and ALA. ODlt
§ 26-17-607 (Lexis Nexis 2018) (allowillg prmn1med residency/hold out father to 'disprove
paternity at any ime"), with Dir..1.. Com:ANN. tit. 13, § 8-204(a)(5), (b), and DEL. ODE ANN.
tii. 13, § 8-607 a) (2018) (stating presumed residency/hold out father may not seek t
"adjudicate the pa \' ntage of a child hav ing a Pl'esumed father ... [twoj years after the birth
f the ·hild"), a,nd COLO. R EV. STAT. § 19-4-105(1)(d), (2)(a) (2018) (allowing pi:esumed
residency/hold out father to r ebut presumption "in an appropriate action''). As well, state
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nonmarital parentage, as with VAPs and residencies/hold outs, their
disestablishment norms can also vary. 202 So, interstate variations in
residency/hold out parentage laws, involving either parentage
establishment or disestablishment, can prompt choice of law issues in
childcare parentage disputes.
D. De Facto Parentage

By contrast to spousal, acknowledged, and residency/hold out
parentage, de facto parentage under the 2017 UPA and comparable state
laws (often employing different terminology, like equitable adoptive
parent or presumed parent) should more frequently prompt the interests
of several forums. Recall that de facto parentage under the 2017 UPA c~n
involve some residency, child support, child caretaking, and support by a
legal parent of the parental-like acts of a then nonparent. 20 a These acts
need not begin at birth, and may extend well beyond a two-year period,
unlike the presumptive residential parentage recognized in the 2000
UPA.204 Relevant acts preceding a dispute over de facto parentage under
the 2017 UPA can thus occur in several states, which may or may not
include the forum state where parentage is to be adjudicated.205
Choice of the appropriate de facto parentage law-to resolve either a
custody/visitation request by an alleged de facto parent or a child support
request against an alleged de facto parent-will be necessary, of course,
in settings where de facto parenthood laws materially differ in two or
more interested U.S. states. While generally seeking to promote
nationwide uniformity through individual state lawmaking (via statute
or precedent, though statute seems preferred),206 the NCCUSL
laws vary on who may seek to rebut a residency/hold out presumed parentage. Compare,
e.g., ALA. CODE§ 26-17-204(a)(5), (b), and ALA. CODE§ 26-17-607(a) (LexisNexis 2018) ("[If
a] presumed father persists in his status as the legal father ... neither the mother nor any
other individual may maintain an action to disprove paternity."), with DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
13, § 8-204(a)(5), (b), and DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-607(a) (providing that usually, the
"mot.her or another individual" can bring a proceeding "to adjudicate the parentage of u
child having a presumed father").
202. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 584-4(a)(4), (6) (2018) (providing presumed natural
fatherhood for man who receives child into his home while openly holding out the child as
his natural child or who executes a voluntary paternity acknowledgment). Here,
disestablishment norms will inevitably vary given the federal mandates on VAP challenges
and the very different prerequisites to parentage establishment via residency/hold out.
203. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 609.
204. Id. § 609(d)(l)-(7) .
205. See infra Section (V)(A)(l) (reviewing North Dakota and Ohio cases where courts
were asked to assess de facto parentage conduct occurring outside their state borders).
206. See, e.g., UN!F. PARENTAGE ACT§ 1001 (stating courts "need to promote uniformity"
when "applying and construing" the UPA provisions adopted in their states). On separation
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recognizes reasonable policymaking can yield differing results. Thus for
de facto parenthood, the 2017 UPA provides alternative models on the
issue of whether a child may have more than two custody/visitation
parents.201 The first two states to substantially enact the 2017 UPA,
including its de facto parent provisions, have differed on this issue. In
Vermont, proceedings "to adjudicate competing claims of parentage or
challenges to a child's parentage by two or more persons," adjudications
must serve "the best interests of the child." 2os In Washington, a child may
be adjudicated to have more than two parents only if a failure to so
recognize "would be detrimental to the child."209
There are other material differences in U.S. state de facto parent laws.
The 2017 UPA, followed in Vermont210 and Washington,211 requires an
alleged de facto parent to prove ''consistent caretaking;" holding out the
child as the individual's child; and residing with the child "as a regular
member of the child's household for a significant period of time."212 In
Delaware, whose statute served as a model for the 2017 UPA,213 the de
facto parentage law has none of those requirements. 214 Maine, whose
statute also served as a model for the 2017 UPA on de facto parentage,215
does not require a holding out, though it does demand, unlike the 2017
UPA, Vermont, Washington, and Delaware provisions, "[C]lear and
of powers issues in the realm of state childcare parentage lawmaking by legislatures and
courts, see Jeffrey A. Parness, State Lawmaking on Federal Constitutional Childcare
Parents: More Principled Allocations of Powers and More Rational Distinctions, 50
CREIGHTON L. REV. 479 (2017).
207. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 613(c) (providing Alternative A: "court may not adjudicate
a child to have more than two parents"; and Alternative B: court may recognize more than
two parents if failure to so recognize "would be detrimental to the child").
208. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 206 (2018). De facto parentage guidelines appear in VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 501(a) (2018), with "clear and convincing evidence" required if there
may be more than two parents, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 501(b) (2018). At least one U.S.
state court has ruled three-parent standards violate federal constitutional precedents on
avoiding interference with the superior childcare rights of two existing legal parents.
Bancroft v. Jameson, 19 A.3d 730 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2010) (finding DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 8-201 (2018) on de facto parentage impermissibly allows interference with childcare
interests of two fit parents). But see A.L. v. D.L., No. CK12-01390, 2012 Del. Fam. Ct. LEXIS
83 (Sept. 19, 2012) (disagreeing); see also J .W.S. v. E.M.S., No. CSll-01557, 2013 Del. Fam.
Ct. LEXIS 27 (May 29, 2013) (three parents: biological mother, adjudicated biological
father, and de facto parent).
209. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26A.460(3) (LexisNexis 2018).
210. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15C, § 501(a)(l)(A), (B), (D) (2018).
211. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26A.440(4)(a), (b), (d) (LexisNexis 2018).
212. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 609(d)(l), (2), (4).
213. UN!F. PARENTAGE ACT§ 609 cmt, para. 1.
214. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c), 1101(10) (2018) (on "parental responsibilities").
215. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 609 cmt, para. 1.
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convincing evidence that the person has fully and completely undertaken
a permanent, unequivocal, committed[,] and responsible parental role in
the child's life."216 So, interstate variations on de facto childcare
parentage can prompt choice of law issues.

E. Parentage Following Assisted Reproduction Births
Fortunately, the 2017 UPA updates the 2002 (and 1973) UPA by
providing suggested state-law norms on legal parentage arising from
assisted human reproduction, whether or not the woman giving birth
intends to raise the child and whether or not there are biological ties
between intended parent(s) and children. If the 2017 UPA has a reception
in U.S. state legislatures, U.S. state laws on assisted human
reproduction will be more sensible and respectful of intended family
structures, however nontraditional to some. 217
For children born of assisted reproduction, the longstanding dual
parentage policies within U.S. state laws have been loosened, for good
reasons. Some state laws now recognize that unwed women can secure
single parenthood through giving birth via assisted reproduction where
the sperm donors are not recognized as legal parents.21s Further, some
state laws now recognize that unwed men can secure single parenthood
through the services of gestational (if not genetic) carriers (also known
as surrogates) who are not recognized as legal parents.219 In some states,
216. ME. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 1891(3) (2018). Note that these requirements on de facto
parentage, however different state to state, are sometimes also used in nonparent childcare
settings. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Knott (In re H.S.H.-K.), 533 N.W.2d 419, 435-36 (Wis. 1995)
("parent-like relationships;" same household residence; and ''bonded, dependent
relationship parental in nature").
217. Here, there is no exploration of interstate and intrastate variations on childcare
parentage arising from births due to assisted reproduction involving semen placement in a
uterus and a fertilized embryo placement in a uterus. See, e.g., Patton v. Vanterpool, 806
S. F..2d 49::l (Ga. 2017) (holding artificia 1 insemim1t.ion statute on presumptive legitimacy of
children born within wedlock does not apply when children are born of in vitro fertilization).
218. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 3111.89 (LexisNexis 2018) ("non-spousal artificial
insemination for the purpose of impregnating a woman so that she can bear a child that
she intends to raise as her child" through using the semen of a man who is not her husband);
Szafranski v. Dunston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1163 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (holding ex-girlfriend is
not enjoined, due to earlier contract, from using cryopreserved pre-embryos she created
with her ex-boyfriend, while observing ex-boyfriend could later sue for a declaration that
he was not "the natural father" of any later-born child). "Due process safeguards," however,
together with state contract law principles may prompt some sperm donors under the
statute to be fathers under law, C.O. v. WS., 639 N.E.2d 523, 525 (Ohio Comm. Pl. 1994),
as when future parental childcare interests were not subject to earlier waivers and, in fact,
were expressly recognized by both the donors and birth mothers.
219. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (2018) (unwed sperm donors can utilize
surrogates), and In re Roberto D.B, 923 A.2d 115 (Md. 2007) (similar), with In re Paternity
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assisted reproduction via gestational surrogacy arrangements can even
prompt single legal parentage for those with no biological ties to their
children. 22 0 These assisted reproduction laws, 221 leaving children with
only one legal parent at birth, make sense as they provide parentage
opportunities for women and men who may otherwise be unable to
parent. These laws reasonably assume single intended parents will
become good parents; 222 they aim to insure informed decision-making by
those involved in child creation; and, they clarify the legal status of those
involved in assisted reproduction, as by relieving certain semen and egg
donors of later financial obligations and by insuring intended parents of

& Maternity of Infant T., 991 N.E.2d 596 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that unwed sperm
donor can disestablish paternity of surrogate's husband who consented to disestablishment,
but could not disestablish maternity of surrogate who gave birth even though she too had
agreed to disestablishment; court' reasoned there would otherwise be no second parent).
Surrogacy laws vary widely among American states, with some states barring such
arrangements while others allow them; some states still having no statute or major case
precedent. See, e.g., Jillian Casey, Courtney Lee & Sartaz Singh, Assisted Reproductive
Technologies, 17 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 83, 99-107 (2016) (reviewing varying American state
surrogacy laws); Joseph F. Morrissey, Surrogacy: The Process, the Law, and the Contracts,
51 WILLAME'ITE L. REV. 459 (2015) (similar); Mark Strasser, The Updating of Baby M· A
Confused Jurisprudence Becomes More Confusing, 78 U. PITI. L. REV. 181 (2016) (similar).
Even where parentage via surrogacy pacts is not recognized, intended parents can
sometimes prevail on their parentage claims. See, e.g., In re Adoption of J., 72 N.Y.S.3d 811,
811, 813 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2018) (finding sperm donor could prevail on parentage claim under
"equitable estoppel" theory even where there was "a patently illegal surrogacy contract").
220. Compare In re T.J.S., 16 A.3d 386 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (reasoning that
husband is the father of a child born to gestational carrier who used the husband's sperm
and anonymously donated ovum, but his infertile wife could not be listed as a parent on the
child's birth certificate even with the husband's consent), aff'd, 54 A.3d 263 (N.J. 2012),
with 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 46/703(a) (LexisNexis 2018) (husband's consent to his wife's
pregnancy via assisted reproduction with anonymously. donated sperm can lead to the
husband being a presumed natural father).
221. State assisted reproduction laws are often guided by the models developed by such
entities as the NCCUSL and the American Bar Association (ABA). Charts briefly
describing, and citing to, American state laws on varying forms of assisted human
reproduction (such as, donor insemination; marital presumptions; nonmarital nonbiological
parentage; intended parentage; and gestational surrogacy) are found in Douglas Nejaime,
The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L.J. 2260, 2363-81 (2017). Techniques for assisted
human reproduction are reviewed in Charles Thomas, Novel Assisted Reproductive
Technologies and Procreative Liberty: Examining In Vitro Gametogenesis Relative to
Currently Practiced Assisted Reproductive Procedures and Reproductive Cloning, 26 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J . 623, 625-29 (2017).
222. At times, permissive assisted reproduction laws require that intended parents
cannot otherwise have children outside of formal adoption. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 742.15(2) (LexisNexis 2018) (allowing gestational surrogacy contract only where the
commissioning mother "cannot physically gestate a pregnancy to term" or otherwise safely
deliver a child).
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opportunities for childrearing. 223 Unfortunately, some limited assisted
reproduction laws prompting at birth only a single legal parent, the birth
mother, make no sense. In 2017, for example, the Idaho Supreme Court
rejected an unwed woman's claim to parentage of a child born of assisted
reproduction to her former partner because the statute only addressed
parentage of a birth mother's consenting spouse. 224 What happened to
equality principles involving the wed and unwed, and the dual parentage
at birth policy, if not the privacy interest in having children? Are unwed
lesbian couples more likely to be worse parents than wed lesbian (or wed
opposite sex) couples, or more likely not to understand the childcare
agreements they undertake? I think not.
Unfortunately, most U.S. state lawmakers have yet to resolve the
standards on single parenthood arising from assisted reproduction
involving frozen embryos where only one of the two donors wishes to
prompt a pregnancy and birth, while the other objects to employing any
artificial reproductive techniques.225
Of course, assisted reproduction via surrogates raises issues arising
outside of non-surrogacy settings. These issues are quite controversial,
with differing state-law norms. Authorizing states vary on the forms of
permissible surrogacy, with some only recognizing gestational carriers.
Others prohibit parentage via surrogacy altogether. States generally
recognizing surrogacy parentage differ on the details, like the
enforceability of selective reduction clauses in surrogacy contracts. 226
While not foreclosing enforcement of a surrogate agreement, a state law

223. Especially in surrogacy settings, there are legitimate concerns with how the
written laws regulate the contractual undertakings. See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews, Beyond
Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal Framework for Surrogate Motherhood, 81 VA. L. REV. 2343
(1995).
224. Doe v. Doe, 395 P.3d 1287, 1290-91, 1292 (Idaho 2017) (deferring to legislature
while rejecting the woman's constitutional claim as she had a "legally recognized, protected
relationship" with the child). In Strickland v. Day, 239 So. 3d 486, 494 (Miss. 2018), in 2018,
the Mississippi Supreme Court recognized, without a statute directly on point, that a
"then-married" lesbian couple shared parental childcare interests where there was an
agreement to employ assisted reproduction, with an anonymous sperm donor, to conceive
and raise a child together. But see In re Garnys v. Westergaard, 71 N.Y.S.3d 554 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2018) (hinting that only preconception pacts between two women to raise a child
together will be honored).
225. See, e.g., Alyssa Yoshida, The Modern Legal Status of Frozen Embryos, 68
HASTINGS L.J. 711 (2017) (urging a contract analysis where embryos are not "judicial
persons"). ·
226. See, e.g., Julia Dalzell, The Enforcement of Selective Reduction Clauses in
Surrogacy Contracts, 27 WIDENER COMMONWEALTH L. REV. 83 (2018) (urging there should
be some enforcement).
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can be so restrictive that few may venture. 227 Interstate variations on
childcare parentage following assisted reproduction births can prompt
choice of law issues.

V.

CHOICE OF LAW IN CHILDCARE PARENTAGE CASES

The expanded forms of childcare parentage, now significantly
recognized in the 2017 UPA and in U.S. state laws beyond the 2017 UPA,
can prompt the interests of several states. This includes states where
there were some elements of marital residency, nonmarital residency,
child support, child caretaking, or assisted reproduction contracting
relevant to a single child. Too often non-forum interests are ignored when
courts consider expanded childcare parentage. The 2017 UPA should be
amended, and choice of childcare parentage precedents should be
(re)formulated, to recognize and balance better the multistate interests
often arising in expanded childcare parentage cases. Accounting for
multistate interests also helps to avoid significant Full Faith and Credit
Clause issues arising when several states have competing interests in
family relationships, which are developed, unlike most marriages,
without formal state license. 22 8 Before suggesting how choice of law
issues involving expanded childcare parentage should be approached,229
a few troubling cases will be reviewed to illustrate the urgent need for
reform. The first case, a North Dakota Supreme Court ruling involving
2017 UPA-like childcare parentage for both custody and support
purposes, will be examined in great depth. Additional illustrations
involving other expanded forms of childcare parentage follow, including
examples involving VAP and assisted reproduction laws.

227. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-20-1-1 (LexisNexis 2018) (providing that "public
policy" disallows enforcement of a surrogate agreement that requires a surrogate to waive
parental rights to a child).
228. In most marital settings, as Professor Aviel well describes, interstate moves come
only after one state has "first exercised regulatory authority." Aviel, supra note*, at 770.
While she recognizes there is no such earlier exercise in polygamous marital settings,
prompting Full Faith and Credit Clause concerns, there are also no such exercises in
common law marriage settings. Id. at 767-68. As with polygamy, unlicensed common law
marriages are not generally recognized. See, e.g., Jennifer Thomas, Common Law Marriage,
22 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 151 (2009).
229. As Professor Aviel concludes regarding possible Congressional action "in
administering an interstate recognition regime" involving marriage, Aviel, supra note*, at
753-57, I find unlikely Congressional action in administering a regime involving imprecise
parentage (namely, de facto, hold out, or equitable adoption parentage). See, e.g., Jeffrey A.
Parness, Federal Constitutional Childcare Parents, 90 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 965 (2016).
Congress, as noted regarding V APs, has administered such a regime in at least one precise
parentage setting. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(D) (2018).
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A. A Few Troubling Cases
1. UPA-Like De Facto Parentage
The case of Johnson v. Johnson (Johnson 1) 230 illustrates how a state
parentage law, not unlike the 2017 UPA on de facto parentage, can
prompt multistate interests. Trouble can arise when there is an exclusive
use of forum childcare parentage laws during an adjudication of a
"parent-child relationship" or "parentage" involving parental/
parental-like acts in several states. Here, there is usually no clear Full
Faith and Credit Clause mandate as there was no earlier out-of-state
license or other comparable exercise of regulatory state authority
expressly recognizing parenthood under law. 231 The Johnsons, Antonyio
and Madonna, were married in September 1986. No child was born
during this marriage. In August 1988, the Johnsons, then living in New
Jersey, took custody of Jessica in Pennsylvania, then three months old
and the natural granddaughter of Madonna. While Jessica was
scheduled to remain with the Johnsons for only a month, ten years later
Jessica was still living with the Johnsons. 232 Until she was nine, Jessica
believed that Madonna and Antonyio were her biological parents. 233
During this first decade, Jessica was raised as the Johnsons' child,
residing with them as they regularly changed residences due to
Antonyio's Air Force deployments. The Johnsons initiated two separate
formal adoption proceedings, one in New Jersey and one in Kentucky
(where Jessica's natural parents lived). Neither proceeding was
completed due to Antonyio's redeployment. 234 From August 1988 to May

230. 617 N.W.2d 97 (N.D. 2000). Earlier (pre-2017 UPA) thoughts on choice of law
guidelines in imprecise parentage cases appear in Jeffrey A. Parness, Choosing Among
Imprecise American State Parentage Laws, 76 LA. L. REV. 481 (2015).
231. Full Faith and Credit Clause precedents in recognition of out-of-state marriage
settings are reviewed in Avie!, supra note *, at 728-44, who t:harncLerizes Llie rulings as
involving "phantom Full Faith and Credit Clause issues." Id. at 741.
232. Johnson I, 617 N.W.2d at 100. Jessica's biological mother is Michelle Clayton, who
was married to Madonna's son, David Clayton. In August 1988, David was incarcerated in
Vermont. Michelle called the Johnsons requesting help and the Johnsons housed Michelle
for about a week, at which point Michelle went back to Kentucky, and left Jessica with the
Johnsons. Madonna obtained a temporary custody order for thirty days, but Michelle never
returned to retake custody of Jessica. Jessica has no biological ties to Antonyio. Id.
233. Brief for Appellant at para. 4, Johnson I, 617 N.W.2d 97 (No. 990353). Antonyio did
not believe Jessica should have been told "until later in her life" but "Antonyio testified that
he did not see even the----eventual-disclosure of her biological parentage being a factor
that 'was going to change [his] relationship with [Jessica]."' Id.
234. Johnson I, 617 N.W.2d at 100 (resulting £rom the Johnsons' military work
transfers).
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1997, the Johnsons resided primarily in New Jersey and Florida, with
Antonyio occasionally deployed overseas.235
In 1997, Antonyio was deployed to Korea while Madonna and Jessica
resided in Florida. Antonyio requested that Madonna file for divorce in
Florida while he was away, but she never did. 236 In May 1998, Antonyio
was sent to Grand Forks, North Dakota. By then, Madonna and Jessica
were living in Kentucky. Antonyio filed for divorce in North Dakota in
July 1998. There, Madonna sought child support for Jessica, whom she
urged had been equitably adopted by herself and Antonyio. 237 From 1997 .
until 1998, Antonyio voluntarily sent Madonna $500 for support, which
a North Dakota court ordered to continue from July 1998 until the
beginning of the divorce trial in April 1999, at which point Antonyio
stopped making support payments.2as
The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded in 2000 that "North
Dakota law clearly recognizes the doctrine of equitable adoption" founded
on "contract to adopt" principles. 239 The court cited North Dakota cases
on "contract to adopt" in inheritance settings. 240 Yet, it recognized that
the contract principles in the two settings should differ, with a more
significant commitment to continuing parent-like care necessary in the
child support setting.241
Without North Dakota cases directly on point, the North Dakota high
court referenced three out-of-state cases imposing a child support duty
235. Id. at 124.
236. Brief for Appella nt., supra note 233, at para. 4 (including fa cts that, at this time,
Antonyio asked Madonna to mov to Kentucky, and subs£lquently f r her to file for divorce
there, while he was stationed overseas; however, Madonna never initiated divorce
proceedings).
237. Johnson I, 617 N.W.2d a t 101.
238. Johnson v. Johnson, 652 N.W.2d 315, 318 (N.D. 2002) [hereinafaer Juhnson II].
239. Johnson I, 617 N.W.2d at 101--02.
240. Id. at 102-03; see also Geiger v. Estat e of onnelly, 271 N.W.2d 570 (N.D. 1978);
Fish v. Berzel, 101 N.W.2d 548 (N.D. 1960); Muhlhauser v. Becker, 20 N.W.2d 353 (N.D.
1945); Botner v. Lal'Son, 293 N.W. 836 (N.D. 1940); Kl in v. Klein, 286 N.W. 898 (N.D .
].!)39). ft a lso cited Ceglowshi u. Zachar, 102 r . upp. 513 (D.N.D. 1951) (enforcing a
forty-year-old contract to arlopi mad by a .NorLb Da kota childless couple who brought a
child over Cl'om Germ any as a res ult, wher ch.i:ld s ued aft r husband died in 194.9 and his
widow died intestate in 1950).
241. John son I, 617 N.W. 2d a t W!l ("Applical.ion of Lhe do.ctrine of equitable adoption in
the domestic context, u11likc iru applica tion in inb rltance cases, co ntemplal.es un ougoing
relationship be tw ·en livin g par ties a nd , therefo rn, some thing mor e than the agreenumt to
adopt is requ fr d. The inquiry includes wh ther th t'e exist indicia of a true [parent-child]
i:elationship between the child o.nd the ullegecl equitnbl parent. Some of the fa cts and
circumstances considered by courts include representations . .. that she was their natural
child . . . that she had been adopted; hold ing the child out to the co mmunity ... incomplete
efforts to adopt . .. and the m1tur11 l pfl re nts' conse nt to the adopt ion.").
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upon an equitable adoption parent. In one, the obligor was a stepfath r
who supported the child during his marriage to the woman who primarily
car d for the child; claimed the child as dependent for tax pul'poses; and
promised to adopt the child.242 ln another, the obligor was a stepfather
who agreed with his wife to adopt her child from a previous marriage;
treated th child as his own; began the adoption process; and act d to
terminate the parental rights of the child's natural father.243 In a third,
a soon-to-be ex-husband was the obligor because he brought the child to
Maryland from Ixan; made adoption promis s to his wife and to the
Republic of Iran; and lived with the child for fo
months. 244 While
employing these cases, the court in Johnson J recognized that there were
differing approaches elsewhere.245
The court in Johnson I determined that state public policy s(lpported
application of an equitable adoption doctrine "to impose a child support
obligation under certain circumstanc s." 246 The court found that no
North Dakota statutes forbade it. 247 Ail high coui't members fail d to
address in great detail, however, the distinctions between Antonyio's
legal parenthood in child support and inheritance settings.248 'l'he court
remanded for resolution of the factual issues relevant to applying the
equitable adoption doctrine249 to child supp0Tt.2no
A dissenting justice began, "This is a case of a grandmother and her
grandchild who have never lived in NorthDakota."261 He went on, "[I]t is

242. Id. at 104 (finding "instructive" Wener v. Wener, 312 N.Y.S.2d 815, 817-18 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1970)).
243. Id. (finding "instructive" Frye v. Frye, 738 P.2d 505, 505 (Nev. 1987)).
244. Id. (finding "instructive" Geramifar v. Geramifar, 688 A.2d 475 (Md. 1997)).
245. Id. at 104 n.2.
246. Id. at 109.
24 7. Id. Such an application of the eq uitable adoption doctrine, however, was "limitecr'
as the court expressed "preference for adherence to statutory proced111·es" on formal
adoptions. Id. at 106 n.3.
248. Id. at 101. Antonyio never sought childcare or visitation oppo1turut:1es; the request
from Madonna was solely for monetary support for herself-which was deni d-and child
s upport for Jessica. AB Antonyio had not sought sole or shared Clli!to<ly f J ssica, or
visi.tation, pursuant to a North Dakota ceurt order, the North Dakota cow:ts did not need
to consider how "contract to adopt" principles would apply in childcare settings.
249. It did no "searching inquiry'' into the respective state interests at stake. Aviel,
supra note*, ai 770.
250. Johnsort I, 617 N.W.2d at 10 10. In 2002, the North Dakota Supteme Court
sustained some parts of the lowe1· court's child 1..uppotl orders. J ohnson Tl, 652 N.W.2d at.
319 (sustaining child suppol.'t order though it was lnappropriat ly lahel d r1s a "spousal
support" order).
251. Johnson I, 617 N.W.2d at 112 (Sandstorm, J., dissenting). It is unclear why there
was no mention of the possible application of Florida law.
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clear that if an 'equitable adoption' took place, it took plac in New Jersey
or Kentucky and would thei-efore be governed by the law of one of those
states."2r;2 In both New Jersey and Kentucky, the dissent found there to
be no equitable adoption doctrine .253 New Jersey or Kentucky law was
deemed appropriate by the dissent under North akota choice of. law
rules for contract cases because formal adop ions, that is possible
contracts had been attempted there.m Th majority did not respond.
The dissenting justice did11ot explai11 why th - equitable doption policies
of neither Pennsylvania (where the child was first placed with the
Jobnsons) nor Florida (where th Johnsons raised th , child for quite
some time) would ver apply.26& No justic explained why an ncontract
approach to choice of law was noL appropriate. Analogizing th John ons'
acts to torts would also prompt an interest analysis as did analogizing
th acts to contracts, but the tort analys is would include the interests of
all the states wherein Jessica had liv d. So, no opinion in Johnson I
utilized an interest analysis involving all inter sted tates to det rmine
which state's child suppol't law, via an equitable adoption theory or
otherwise, might operat . Wh n child support was sought Antonyio was
252. Id.
253. Id. In New Jersey, regardless of the lack of any expr•ssly r cogni<.r. d "equitable
adoption" doctrine, there is a "psycho) gical pare nt" doct rin.e allowing a non par nt to morph
iuto a parent in certain setti11gs not necessarily tied to o parlicular time, which arguably
would encompass both Antonyio and Madonna. See, e.g., V. •. v. M.J .B., 748 A.2d 539,
551-52 (N.J. 2000) (stating "legal paren must consent to al.ld foster" the parental -like
re)atimlBbip, which include also the child's residence with Lh non patent during which time
"parental functions" a.re performed. "for the child to a significanl degr ee"). ln Kentucky,
beyond any possible expressly recognized "equitable adopLion" doctriue, there is, compared
to New Jersey, the rath 1· limited "de facto custodia11" dockin . K.Y. RRV. S'I'A'l\ ANN .
§ 103.270(1 (a) (LexisNexis 2018) (allowing custody 1;;t;:indi11g nnly for ono who, "by clenr
a.nd convincing evidence," was "primary caregiver" and "Cinan •itil s upport.er"). The dissent
in Johnson I did lat l" opine, howev r, that a "determination of equitabl adoption s hould
be made in Kentucky by declaratory judgmenL or other prc1cecding-." Johnson I, 617 N.W.2d
at 124.
254. Johnson I, 617 N.W.2d at 123.
256. While Pennsylvania's gover11.mental int.erest.s seem weak. if wholly absent, Jessica
was delivered to the Johnsons in Pennsy lvf\nia, wher, any agreements to future
childcai-e/child support may have bee n entered and wher·. any waiv rs of th parental
ri.gbts of th.e biological parn.nts may h ve be n unde.rtak n. As to a possib1 equitabl,
adoption (o.r compa1•abJe legal pru·entage) doctrine til'ising in P nnsyl vttnia from
contract-like acts, com par', for example, J<, ilby u. Folsom, 23~ F.2d ·99 (3d ir. 1956)
(agreeing to adopt and c1·ente a parent-Uk relationship. I.hough no for.ma] adoption) with
Miller v. Ribico(f, 209 F. Supp. 460 (E.D. Pa. 1 62) (no i;uch agre mentor r lat:ionship) . .As
to a possible equ'i.table adoption (or co mparabl leg(;I.] parento ) doctrin e arising in Fl rida
from parental-like acts by norrpo.rent.~ involving cbildcm-e 91· chj ]d s upport, se , for exa.oo ple,
MiLSic v. Ra.chford. 654 So. 2d 1,284 1235 (Fla. Dist. 'L A).lp. 1st 1995) (d lei-mining n
inherentauthorit)' regarding cle facto pa1 nl,Hg as "visit.ation r ights axe ... slatu ory").
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in North Dakota while Jessica and Madonna were in Kentucky.
Antonyio's parental-like acts, including conduct amounting to a contract
to adopt, occurred chiefly in New Jersey and Florida, if not Pennsylvania.
Further, no opinion considered whether jurisdiction should be declined
altogether, or at least over the parentage issue.
Upon remand, the lower court found that Antonyio and Madonna had
equitably adopted Jessica and then set child support under North Dakota
law. 256 The case returned again to the supreme court on the issue of the
amount of support owed by Antonyio.257
The use of a North Dakota equitable adoption doctrine allowed a
nonparent to become a parent responsible for child support, though he
never did or would care for the child in North Dakota. The support
obligation conceivably could be applied retroactively to cover any time
when there was an equitable adoption via a contract to adopt. For
Antonyio, child support could depend on his acts in Pennsylvania, New
Jersey, or Florida; the North Dakota courts never determined at which
precise moment the contract to adopt, including the requisite
parental-like acts, occurred.
The North Dakota Supreme Court held that since the trial court had
correctly found Antonyio equitably adopted Jessica, the original $500
order should apply retroactively for the time between the start of the first
trial in April 1999 and the end of the second trial in October 2001.258 It
also ruled the $669 support order should operate after the end of the
second trial in October 2001. 259 The decision clearly rested on an
equitable adoption finding that Antonyio was Jessica's legal parent
before he moved to North Dakota and before his divorce case was filed.260
256. Brief for Appellant at para. 6, Johnson II, 652 N.W.2d 315 (No. 20010288). The
trial court applied the child support calculation standard of North Dakota, but held the
payments to begin October 1, 2001, after the court ruled that the equitable adoption
occurred; the court also ruled that Antonyio was eligible for interim support of $500 for
August and September 2001. Johnson II, 652 N.W.2d at 317.
257. The supreme court recognized in 2002 that Antonyio had been paying Madonna
$500 a month in "interim spousal support" from May 1997 (and thus, before he moved to
North Dakota) until April 1999, which was "intended to be child support." Johnson II, 652
N.W.2d at 318-19. While Antonyio was ordered to pay child support to Madonna in the
amount of $500 through August 1998, the last payment was made on March 3, 1999, before
the commencement of the first trial in April 1999; from April 1999 until July 2001, Antonyio
was not ordered to pay, and did not pay, anything to Madonna for child support. Id.
258. Id. at 319.
259. Id. at 320. The July 2001 ruling on Antonyio's equitable adoption of Jessica applied
the interim child support order to more than two years of back child support from the
commencement of the first trial in April 1999. Id.
260. Antonyio moved to North Dakota in May 1998 and filed for divorce there in July
1998. His only connection with Jessica during that time was the $500 in child support he
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Although Antonyio never sought a childcare order, he was still liable for
child support to Madonna, who had custody of Jessica, albeit in
Kentucky. The equitable adoption doctrine in North Dakota allowed a
previous nonparent like Antonyio to become a parent responsible for
child support. The support obligation could be applied retroactively to
cover any time when there was a form of childcare parentage. In Johnson
II, Antonyio's parentage was recognized as arising (at least) at the time
he filed for divorce, though an earlier time seemingly would have been
quite reasonable, given the equitable adoption principles guiding
inheritance cases.261
Another troubling choice of law case involving UPA-like de facto
parentage is S.D. v. K.H.,262 a 2018 Ohio appellate court ruling. A 2007
Ohio divorce decree found a husband and wife to be the biological and
legal parents of a child, and then established "full and legal custody" in
the mother, with visitation for the father. Thereafter, a California court
in 2014 found in a stipulated order that another woman was also a
childcare parent for the child. In early 2016, the father sought to set aside
in California the 2014 parentage order favoring "Mother 2," occurring
after the natural mother sought a California court order allowing her to
relocate with the child to Ohio. The California court denied this request
in July 2016. This was followed by Mother 2's petition in September 2016
asking the Ohio divorce court to enforce the California parentage ordera request opposed by the natural parents. The Ohio court denied, in late
2016, Mother 2's petition to enforce, though it recognized that she could
pursue a child "companionship time" order as an intervener in the 2007
divorce case, she could not pursue a child "parenting time" order because
the California court's parentage order was issued without subject matter

voluntarily paid to Madonna in those few months. Id. At least some of the equitable
adoption precedents in inheritance cases cited in Johnson I were grounded on parental-like
acts in North Dakota that went well beyond a few months of voluntary child support. See,
e.g., Fish, 101 N.W.2d at 550-51 (decedent acted as a father from 1917 to 1956, when he
died); Ceglowski, 102 F. Supp. at 514-15 (decedent acted as mother for at least
twenty-seven years).
261. Johnson II, 652 N.W.2d at 320. A different choice of parentage law issue would
have been presented in a divorce proceeding brought by Madonna in Kentucky, in which
Antonyio appeared and defended. Might not Kentucky law be reasonably applied to the
issue of Antonyio's parentage, as only child support was sought and Jessica was then living
in Kentucky with Madonna, who was in need there of child aid? See, e.g., H.O. v. State
(State ex rel. S.O.), 122 P.3d 686 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (applying Utah law in parental rights
termination hearing involving father whose alleged abusive acts occurred in Arizona, where
an Arizona court declined jurisdiction over a child custody dispute).
262. 98 N.E.3d 375 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018).
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jurisdiction. 263 These rulings were affirmed, with "the companionship
matter" left for trial.264
The Ohio courts clearly chose not to defer to the employment of
California law that recognized Mother 2 could be a third legal parent,265
·or to the California court ruling that Mother 2 was such a parent. They
did so because "Ohio does not recognize more than two legal parents,"266
thus rejecting Mother 2's argument that Ohio courts apply California's
three-parent law to her parentage request because all of Mother 2's
parental-like actions occurred in California, as did the concession of her
parentage by the natural mother, who had "full and legal custody."267
This failure to defer meant Mother 2's nonparental companionship claim
arising from her conduct in California would be adjudicated in Ohio
under Ohio law. The Ohio courts failed to consider California's
governmental interests in the childcare of a child who had been living in
California, where two women shared ·~oint physical custody" for at least
two years and where the child was moved to Ohio by the natural mother
before there was a ruling on the motion in the California case on the
natural mother's refocation. 268 The Ohio courts also, quite reasonably,
failed to consider whether a California court provided "a more convenient
forum" to resolve the nonparent companionship claim.269
2. Voluntary Parentage Acknowledgment
Another expanded form of childcare parentage, not necessarily
dependent upon actual biological ties, actual or attempted marriage, or
formal adoption, involves a VAP (usually, but not always, in a paternity
setting). Multistate interests rarely arise in initial parentage
establishments via signed VAPs. As noted, under federal statute, every
U.S. state participating in federal welfare assistance subsidy programs
must recognize a VAP properly undertaken in another U.S. state.210
Infrequently, a state-recognized VAP form from one state will be properly

263. Id. at 376-78.
264. Id.
265. CAL. FAM. CODE§ 7612(c) (Deering 2018) (to avoid detriment to the child).
266. S.D., 98 N.E.3d at 379.
267. Id. at 376-78.
268. Id. at 376.
269. Id. at 377 n .1 (noting that, per the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) adopted in Ohio, a state court can "decline jurisdiction if
another state would offer a more convenient forum") . In the Ohio case, the companionship
claim of a California person involved a child and two legal parents who then all lived in
Ohio. Id. at 376.
270. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C)(iv).
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employed in a second state. 271 So, initial VAP undertakings usually are
guided by a single U.S. state's laws. Here, there is a formal state license,
reflecting an exercise of regulatory authority, which typically must be
respected in other states.212 However, multistate interests do arise where
a VAP that is undertaken in one state is later challenged in a second
state. Challengers typically come more than sixty days after signing,
must demonstrate "fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact," and
(unlike VAP recessions within sixty days) may include non-signatories. 273
When a VAP signed in state A is challenged in state B, whose challenge
norms should govern? The federal requirement of fraud, duress, or
mistake in VAP challenge cases has not been uniformly interpreted.
Further, the need to recognize VAP parentage establishments has not yet
been widely read to demand full deference to the VAP disestablishment
norms operating where the challenged VAPs were undertaken. 274 Choice
of law issues arise in VAP challenge cases as the norms on timing of
challenges, the standing of non-signatories to challenge, and the estoppel
barriers to challenges vary widely interstate.
The 2017 UPA provides little guidance on choice of VAP challenge
norms. It says only that U.S. state courts shall respect a VAP "effective
in another state" if the VAP "was in a signed record and otherwise
complies with the law of the other state." 27 5 This seemingly covers issues
involving the initial effectiveness of VAPs, not their later ineffectiveness.
Current U.S. state statutes on VAP challenges at least sometimes
provide little guidance. Thus, in New Hampshire the courts are required
to "give full faith and credit to a determination of paternity made ...

271. But see, e.g., Teague, 999 So. 2d at 92 (including facts where an Indiana VAP form
was signed and notarized in Louisiana; no need to give full faith and credit to the VAP as
the signatures did not follow either Louisiana or Indiana law). On occasion, a VAP form
from one state is permitted by that state to be executed outside the state. See, e.g., Parness
& Townsend, supra note 123, at 74 (reviewing Illinois Department of Public Health,
Division of Vital Records Form No. DPA 3416BC4, Voluntary Acknowledgment of Paternity
(rev. Aug. 2000) and also noting Colorado statute, COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-2-112(1) (2018),
that allows a Colorado VAP to be used for a child born on a "moving conveyance" within the
United States if the child is first removed from the conveyance in Colorado).
272. Thus, VAPs are like marriages. But see Aviel, supra note*, at 731-34 (reviewing
marriage cases wherein state need not recognize marriage licenses issued in other states
due to overriding public policy concerns).
273. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 309(a)-(b).
274. But see Burden v. Burden, 945 A.2d 656, 664-65 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008)
(complying with the Full Faith and Credit Clause respect for out-of-state "records," court
applies South Dakota law in a challenge to a VAP filed in South Dakota, though the ruling
is only dicta as the use of Maryland law "would not alter the result in this case").
275. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 311.
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through voluntary acknowledgment of paternity."276 In New Jersey,
comparable full faith and credit is to be given to an out-of-state paternity
determination via a VAP on behalf of a "natural father."277 In
Connecticut, an out-of-state VAP as to paternity is given "full faith and
credit" if "signed" in accordance with the out-of-state procedures.278 In
Oklahoma, there is credit if "signed and otherwise in compliance" with
the out-of-state laws. 279 In California, there is some greater indication
that California challenge norms shall apply to an out-of-state VAP.
There, a "previous determination of paternity," including via a VAP, is to
be given "the same effect" as a California-made paternity determination
and thus "may be enforced and satisfied in a like manner" as a paterliity
determination made in California.2so
In a multistate interest setting involving a state court challenge to a
VAP executed elsewhere, the VAP is to be given "full faith and credit" if
it is signed "in any other State according to its procedures." 281 General
civil procedure judgment modification standards are applied to these
challenges in some states. 282 Elsewhere, there operate special civil
procedure VAP modification standards. 283 Wherever the origins of the
standards, questions can arise where certain VAP challenge standards
are deemed substantive and thus must originate in the laws of the state
where the VAP was initially executed if those laws differ from the forum
state laws. Is a time bar to a VAP challenge substantive? Is a standing
barrier on who can challenge a VAP substantive? To what extent can the
"fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact'' requisite be deemed
substantive (as where the natural father-due "a reasonable opportunity
to initiate a paternity action" 284-is unfairly blocked from seeking a
parentage determination in the forum state)?
Issues involving the choice of VAP modification standards in
multistate settings generally remain unaddressed. Unlike the 2017
UPA's strong suggestion, forum courts should sometimes employ the
276. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-A:2 (II).
277. N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 9:17-41(b) (West 2018).
278. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-172(a)(4).
279. OKLA. STAT. § 7700-311. Comparable is ALA. CODE§ 26-17-311; N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-llA-311; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.311; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-611; see also LA.
STAT. ANN. § 9:393 (deference to VAP from another state "executed" in accordance with "the
laws and procedures" of that state).
280. CAL. FAM. CODE§ 5604.
281. Federal statutory directives, in 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C)(iv), are generally
recognized, as in the UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 311 cmt., to prompt such status.
282. See, e.g., Parness & Saxe, supra note 136, at 200-03.
283. See, e.g., id. at 196-99 (reviewing varying special timing limits on VAP challenges).
284. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(L) (2018) .
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VAP modification standards of the states where the VAPs were signed
and recorded. Consider the 2016 New Hampshire high court employment
of New Hampshire law on marriage annulment standards for a 1986 New
York marriage of a couple that had resided in New Hampshire since
2008, with earlier marital residences in New York (for four years),
Massachusetts (for four years), and New Jersey (for thirteen years).2B5
The petitioner had urged application of New York law to the issue of
fraud in the inducement of the marriage since "annulment of marriage
concerns whether a marriage is void at its inception." 2B6 However, the
petitioner, as well as the respondent, agreed that a New Hampshire
choice oflaw analysis was needed.287 Given the high court's emphasis, for
example, on the length of New Hampshire residency, the protection of
offspring in New Hampshire, and a concern for "a potential drain" on
New Hampshire, 288 the law of New Hampshire was applied. It is likely
that differing facts would have altered the result.289
Of course, VAPs may be challenged by non-signatories as well as by
signatories, unlike marriage annulments where non-spouses may not
challenge. Different state VAP challenge laws might be deemed
applicable to different challengers. Consider in a New Hampshire case, a
New Hampshire governmental challenge to a New York VAP (in order to
pursue the biological father for welfare reimbursement), as compared to
a Rhode Island man's challenge (in order to pursue his own childcare
parentage) to the same VAP, where the child was conceived in Rhode
Island and the biological father was "thwarted" when an interest in his
potential offspring was shown. 290

3. Parentage Following Assisted Reproduction Births
A further expanded form of childcare parentage, not necessarily
dependent upon actual biological ties, actual or attempted marriage, or
formal adoption, involves parentage arising from assisted reproduction
births. Such births may or may not involve a surrogate. Either way,
285. In re Geraghty, 150 A.3d 386, 390 (N.H. 2016).
286. Id.
287. Id. at 391, 394 ("five choice-influencing considerations" as New Hampshire had a
"stricter approach" to annulment than New York).
288. Id. at 392.
289. For example, consider the New Hampshire/New York governmental interests
where the alleged fraud was far more recent, as was the move to New Hampshire; there
were no offspring in New Hampshire; there was no real concern about potential economic
drain on any state; and New York was the site of a criminal and civil suit in fraud that was
distinct from the New Hampshire dissolution proceeding.
290. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 147 A.3d 434 (N.J. 2016) (analyzing
each defendant separately when determining choice of applicable damage law in a tort suit).
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significant choice of law issues can arise. Consider the choice of law
concerns that prompted two men in Washington state desirous to have a
child to employ Oregon surrogacy laws. 291 The men considered utilizing
varying out-of-state laws as their home-state laws were not then
accommodating. They eventually chose Oregon because under its law
their desired mutual goals were quite achievable. 292 They deemed
California's surrogacy laws to have undesirable attributes.293 A
comparably desirous couple without the financial and legal resources
may face challenging choice of law issues should it ever split up and
dispute childcare parentage issues.
When the birth mother of a child born of assisted reproduction
becomes a childcare parent, significant choice oflaw issues can also arise.
Consider cases where semen (and perhaps egg) donation, implantation,
pregnancy, or birth is each significantly related to a different U.S. state.
Of course, challenging choice of law issues here too can be avoided by
reasonable contractual choice of law provisions. 294 Such provisions are
unlikely in settings where "do it yourself' assisted reproduction
pregnancies are undertaken, and thus where lawyers, doctors, and other
professionals are not involved.
An explicit choice of law provision is absent from the statutory "forms"
guiding, but "not required" for, non-surrogacy assisted reproduction
contracts in California. Here, pregnancies can be undertaken by do it
yourselfers. 29 5 The use of such a form in California is said to "satisfy the
writing requirement" prompting childcare parentage under law for a
sperm donor where the form is signed "prior to the conception of the
child." 296 Employment of these forms can trigger challenging choice of
childcare parentage law issues. Should California law necessarily prompt
childcare parentage for a sperm donor in another state wherein a court
291. The men's avenue to parentage is described in Peter Nicolas, Straddling the
Columbia: A Constitutional Law Professor's Musings on Circumventing Washington State's
Criminal ProhibWon. on Compensated Surrogacy, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1235 (2011). The
avenues to such parentage were earlier described in Susan Frelich Appleton, Surrogacy
Arrangements and the Conflict of Laws, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 399 (1990).
292. See also, e.g., Rodas v. Morin, 814 N.E.2d 320 (Mass. 2004) (giving effect to choice
of Massachusetts law provision in gestational surrogate contract where child was to be born
in Massachusetts to Connecticut genetic parents using a New York surrogate).
293. Nicolas, supra note 291, at 1245.
294. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Adams, 551 N.E.2d 635 (Ill. 1990) (holding that a
stipulation by parties to use Illinois, not Florida, laws on childcare parentage arising from
the birth of a child via assisted reproduction would not be honored as it was unreasonable).
295. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613.5(e) (Deering 2018) (allowing forms where sperm is not
"provided to a licensed physician and surgeon or to a licensed sperm bank") (emphasis
added).
296. CAL. FAM. CODE§ 7613(b)(l) (Deering 2018).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3251452

2019]

CHILDCARE PARENTAGE LAWS

373

is hearing a case to adjudicate parentage, where a California form was
used, but birth occurred elsewhere with differing written consent laws?
The California form is not required to be filed with a California
government official so there is "no license" reflecting a public act. 297
Comparably, with "do it yourself' assisted reproduction nonmarital
births in California, a semen or ova donor is not a parent of a later born,
biologically tied child if the donor and the birth mother "had an oral
agreement" to that effect "prior to the conception." 298 Should California
law necessarily prompt a finding of no legal parentage in a donor where
there was such an agreement in California, but where b1rth occurred in
another state where such an agreement would not be honored (perhaps
because a writing was required or because it could be unilaterally
rescinded during the pregnancy)?299

B. Principles Guiding Choices of Law on Childcare Parentage
The 2017 UPA provision on choice oflaw should be amended to contain
the language "including the rules on choice of law." The absence of this
language in the 1996 and 2008 UIFSA was far less troublesome then,
because, before 2008, expanded forms of childcare parentage were far
more limited. Thus, residency/hold out parents were required to reside
with children for the first two years of the children's lives since the 2000
UPA. While the 1973 UPA had no such residency requirement, between
1973 and 1996 there were likely far fewer instances than there are today
where residency/hold out parentage might arise. Back then, a greater

297. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613.5 (Deering 2018); see also Jeffrey A. Parness, Formal
Declarations of Intended Childcare Parentage, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 87 (2017)
(suggesting new mechanisms for formal declarations of intended childcare parentage
founded u11 Lhe California forms available for non·surrogacy assisted reproduction). U.S.
state laws on consent by donors to their own future intended childcare parentage (or to
their own current intended parentage) operate differently. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 15-11-120(6)(a) (2018) (allowing intended parent to consent to non-surrogacy assisted
reproduction, prompting "a parent-child relationship . . . . Before or after the child's birth");
FLA. STAT. § 742 .11 (LexisN exis 2018) (noting non-surrogacy assisted reproduction prompts
irrebuttable presumption of parenthood for "child born within wedlock" provided spouses
"have consented in writing"); MINN. STAT.§ 524.2-120(5) (2018) (intended parent signed a
record "before or after the child's birth"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-llA-703 (LexisNexis 2018)
(donor or other person can consent); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11A-704(A)-(B) (LexisNexis
2018) (stating failure of intended parent to consent "in a record" signed preconception does
not foreclose parentage if the intended parent resided in same household and held out child
as the parent's own for "the first two years of the child's life").
298. CAL. FAM. CODE§ 7613(b)(2)(B) (Deering 2018).
299. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 524.2-120(9) (2018).
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number of children were born into marriages 300 and fewer children were
essentially raised by grandparents like the Johnsons.3Dl With the
inclusion in the 2017 UPA of this choice of law language, there should
also be explicit recognition in the official comments that more than a
single state's parentage laws might be applied in a single case. Differing
state interests can apply, for example, to custody/visitation and to child
support issues. In Johnson I, Antonyio's satisfaction of any de facto
parent-child custody norm seemingly occurred in New Jersey or Florida,
if not in Pennsylvania, while his child support duties would involve funds
in North Dakota for a child in Kentucky, seemingly making North
Dakota or Kentucky the most interested U.S. state on this aspect of
childcare. 302
An explicit recognition in the 2017 UPA and in state choice of law
precedents, that a forum's choice oflaw principles might sometimes guide
determinations of parental childcare and that differing state interests
might arise in the settings 3D3 involving differing aspects of childcare, like
child custody and child support, would follow other general choice of law
principles where the substantive legal norms are also imprecise, in that
earlier human actions occur at no particular time and in no single place.
300. See, e.g., Lawrence W. Waggoner, Nonmarital Partner Rights and Families Today,
Marriage Is on the Decline and Cohabitation Is on the Rise: At What Point, If Ever, Should
Unmarried Partners Acquire Marital Rights?, 60 FAM. L.Q. 216, 216-24 (2016) (reviewing
data); J . Herbie DiFonzo, How Marriage Became Optional: Cohabitation, Gender, and the
Emerging Functional Norms, 8 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 521, 523 (2011) (increasing
childcare by single parents and relatives).
301. Data on grandparent childcare is available in varying sources, including some
listed in Jeffrey A Parness & Alex Yorko, Nonparental Childcare and Child Contact Orders
for Grandparents, 120 W. VA. L. REV. 95, 110 n.149 (2017), and in Ken Bryson & Lynne M.
Casper, Coresident Grandparents and Grandchildren, CENSUS BUREAU (May 1999),
https://www.census.gov/prod/99pubs/p23-198.pdf (noting that from 1970 to 1997 the
numbers of children living in grandparent-maintained households rose from 2.2 million to
3.9 million).
302. See Johnson I, 617 N.W.2d at 97; see also Johnson II, 652 N.W.2d at 315.
303. Such an explicit recognition would help state courts choose to apply their own
explicit, though general, choice oflaw rules, which may direct the application of non-forum
childcare (including parentage) and child support policies. Consider LA. CIV. CODE ANN.
art. 3515 (2018) ("Except as otherwise provided ... an issue in a case having contacts with
other states is governed by the law of the state whose policies would be most seriously
impaired if its law were not applied to that issue."), whose applicability to both a paternity
and then child support issues were assumed, though not implemented in Edwards v.
Dominick, 815 So. 2d 236, 238 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (concluding no implementation as alleged
father had not "established" the elements of the non-forum laws, so presumptions arose
that they were "the same as the existing law of Louisiana"); cf Crouch v. Smick, 24 N.E.3d
300, 305 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) ("If an Illinois court is determined to be the home state for
jurisdiction, it is necessarily the state with the most significant relationship for
choice-of-law purposes and Illinois law applies.").

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3251452

2019]

CHILDCARE PARENTAGE LAWS

375

Consider, for example, choice of law in contract settings where
bargaining, signing, breach, and harm may all have occurred in different
states. Here, the American Law Institute (ALI) Restatements of Conflict
of Laws have recognized that sometimes a court should employ another
state's contract law. For example, one provision says that the "rights and
duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are determined
by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the
most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties."304
Alternatively, an earlier provision says a court should utilize the local
law of the state where the contract was last signed. so5
Either ALI provision recognizes the need, at times, for a forum court
to apply non-forum law on legal issues pertinent to pending contract
claims. While North Dakota courts have employed an interest analysis
to determine applicable laws for issues in contract settings, aos the
majority in Johnson I failed to utilize this approach though employing
"contract to adopt" principles. 3 07 Consider, as well, choice of law in tort
settings where negligence, causation, and injury all occurred in different
states. Here, too, the ALI Restatements have recognized that sometimes
a court should utilize another state's tort law principles. For example,
one ALI Restatement of Conflict of Laws provision says, "[T]he rights and
liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined
by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the
most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties."3os
Alternatively, an earlier provision encompasses a more precise norm, as
with the use of the local law of the "place of wrong" to determine "whether
a person has sustained a legal injury,"309 where the "place of wrong is in
the state where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an

304. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
305. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332 (AM. LAW INST. 1934);
RESTATEMENT (Frns•r) OF CONTRAC'l'S § 7 4 (AM. LAW1NST. 1932) (law of place of contracting,
with focus on where last act occw·i; that prompts a contract formation).
306. See, e.g., Daley v. Am. States Preferred Ins. Co., 587 N.W.2d 159 (N.D. 1998)
(analyzing two insurance contracts, one for general personal injury issued to a mother and
covering family members, including claimant, and the other issued for a vehicle owned and
maintain d by Lhe claimant); Plante v. Columbia Paints, 494 N.W.2d 140 (N.D. 1992)
(insurance contract).
307. See, e.g., Johnson I, 617 N.W.2d at 108----09.
308. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(1).
309. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS§ 378.
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alleged tort takes place,"aio rather than the use of the state law from the
state where an injury to the person was first manifested. 311
These ALI provisions recognize non -for um substantive tort law may
apply to legal issues pertinent to pending tort claims. The court in
Johnson I, both majority and dissent, failed to consider these provisions,
though the failure to provide child su pport where no prior court order on
such a child support duty was ever entered, has a strong resemblance to
many tort claims involving unintentional duty breaches.
Beside a contract or tort approach to choice of law determinations
when substantive legal norms are imprecise, in that relevant earlier
human actions occur at no particular time or in no particular place,
choices between the imprecise childcare parentage laws of two- or mor
interested states can be, and seem better, determined under an interest
analysis that is independent of, though somewhat analogous to, the
analyses on choices between imprecise contract or tort laws. Such an
independent analysis would follow the North Dakota Supreme Court
approach in a case involving a for mer spouse, divorced in North Dakota,
who allegedly entered into a co mmon law marriage in Canada. The
existence of such a marriage, unrecognized in North Dakota, was
germane to the former spouse's a bility to continue to receive alimony
under the North Dakota clivorce.3 12 H er e, Canadian. law was pertinent
under a North Dakot a statute declaring "all inarriages contracted outside
of this state . .. valid ... where contracted, a:re valid in this s tate.":n a
Even in the absence of a statute, the majority in Johnson I should have
more seriously consider ed whether parentage contracted, or otherwise
arising, outside of Nort h Dakota should be respected in North Dakota.SH
In parental childcare settings outside of North Dakota that implicate
competing and different state interests in families, courts have

310. Id. § 377.

311. R ESTA-TEMENT (SECOND) OF CON FLl O'r Oli' LAWS § 14 5 cm t. f (no ting th at i:n coses o[
false a dvertising a nd misappropri ation of trade va lues, unlike in cases of oth er torts, the
"principal location of th e defenda nt's oonclucr." will be gi ven more weight. th an the 1 cation
of the plac of injury).
312. Pearson v. Pearson, 606 N.W.2d 128, 131 (N.D. 2000).
313. Id. (employing N.D. CENT. CODE§ 14-03-08 (2018)).
314. Outside of North Dakota, a n int rest ana lysis is empl oyed in dis putes over
conflictit1g state la ws a pplicable to family issues. ven whe re thos laws ar non -stat utory.
See, e.g., Han d v. Ha nd, 99 N.E.3d 181, t85-88 (Il l. Ap p. t. 2018) (applyini.; Tili nois
common la w on issue of spousal im munity in torL claims where Illino·is coupl was involved
in an India na a.ccident, wi th_ th e location of the injury being "m r ly forLuitous" a,; wa11
Antonyio J ohnson's pr sence in Nor Lh Dakota).
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recognized a need to employ choice of law norms, with out-of-state 315 and
foreign country316 laws sometimes applicable. As to choice of foreign law
on child custody, for example, the New York high court recognized, as a
matter of comity, the parental custody interests in a female partner of a
birth mother under Vermont law due to an earlier, valid civil union in
Vermont which continued at the time the child was born.317
The failure of both the 2017 UPA and U,S. state courts to recognize
explicitly that a forum's choice of law principles might sometimes guide
childcare parentage adjudications invites violations of federal
constitutional Full Faith and Credit Clause obligations where the
"relationship of the forum State to the parties and the transaction was ...
attenuated."3 18 An "attenuated" relationship between the forum and a
substantive legal issue before a court disallows use of forum law. The
Supreme Court of the United States found an attenuated relationship,
for example, where a Massachusetts corporate insurer issued a life
insurance policy for a New York resident in New York. Upon the
insured's death, the surviving spouse moved from New York to Georgia,
where she sued on the policy. 319 The Court found Georgia law could not
be applied on issues of material misrepresentation arising during the
application for the policy.320 Do the Johnsons not seem similar to the
insured and his spouse?321
315. See, e.g., Wilson v. Wilson, 271 P.3d 1098 (Alaska 2012) (declining to exercise
jurisdiction regarding a request to grant a divorce where a related divorce case was pending
in Ohio).
316. See, e.g., Sinha v. Sinha, 834 A.2d 600 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (finding greater forum
interest in resolving divorce in Pennsylvania than in India where parties were married and
were citizens, and where one spouse had earlier sued for a divorce); Maghu v. Singh, 181
A.3d 618 (Vt. 2018) (granting no deference to Indian law which only allowed a divorce based
on fault).
317. Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 197 (N.Y. 2010).
318. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 310 (1981).
319. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 179 (1936).
320. Id. at 182. At least, and perhaps only, in Georgia can a Georgia court employing
New York common law principles possibly determine the New York common law in ways
that differ from New York case precedents. See, e.g., Coon v. Med. Ctr., Inc., 300 Ga. 722,
797 S.E.2d 828 (2017) (indicating that Georgia follows the reasoning employed before the
Erie doctrine via Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), wherein the common law (but not
statutory law) is presumed to be the same in all U.S. states). Such a view of a uniform
common law operating nationwide may violate full faith and credit mandates.
321. On the failure to recognize that forum parentage law cannot be applied when the
forum's relationship to the parties is attenuated, see, for example, Joslin, supra note 1, at
604 n.89 ("While states are constitutionally required to recognize and enforce out-of-state
judgments, including parentage judgments, it is generally constitutionally permissible for
courts to apply their own state's law to an action properly pending before them.").
Reinsertion of the choice of foreign law option in the UPA, UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 105, for
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Two artificial insemination cases involving the par ntal inte:t1ests of
sperm donol'S illUBi.Tate how ull Fai.th and Credit Clause precedents can
guid choice ofl w determinations involving childcare parentage. In o·ne,
all relevant a tivity occurred in Kansas except that the nonmarital
insemination was per.formed in Missotll'i.. The Kansas Supreme Court;
mployed Kansas law in determining male parentage, distinguishing an
Illinois case wherein Florida law was employed as all relevant activity
leading to conception and birth via a maxital insemination occurred in
Florjda, though th · mother and child latex moved to Illinois wherein a
divorce was later ought. :122
There will be chall nges when choosing between differing U.S. stat
laws for parti ular issues in childcare parentage disputes. ·Such
challenges arise and have been me lsewh re. Recall that the ALI
estatements on on£lict f Laws guide d cisions on an 'issue" in
contract or in tort. Different issues within a contract or tort claim can
p1·ompt the e mployment of d-iffe-ren U.S. state laws.
Th r are comparabl challenges when differentiating between issues
in a f derali m context wher varying choices betw en federal and U.S.
state laws must b m de. onsid r Pulliam u. City of Calumet City,32S
wher a fed raJ district court made choices of law regarding the timing
of filing federal civil claims under 42 U.S. . § 1983.324 The court
recogniz d that state laws would govern the issu sofa limitations period
and any equitable tolling, while£ deral laws would govern claim accrual
and discov ry is ues as well as equitable estopp 1. s25 In a childcare
parentag
dispute involving an earlier voluntary parentage
acknowledgem nL, comparably both federal (such as, on fraud, duress,
and recession issues) and state (such as on timing of challenge and
standing of challengers) laws sometim s must be employed.a2s
Special writt n choice of law norms would be reasonable for certain
parentage disputes. For example, in VAP challenge cases, at least
post-sixty-day challenges by VAP signatories a typically best guided by
the Jaws of th state where th re waR sig11ing an l filing. Itis in that state
certain parentage issues (as arose i.n_ the Joh1J,S01~ I case) would help ins ure that exceptions
to the gen •ral permll;sibillty approach am con:;idered. rt would be helpful as well if the!"e
WM ex:pliciL recognition that differing laws might a1>ply to differing aspects of legal
parentage, Wm chiJdcarll inte.rest.s and child support obligations (as could arise in cal]os lik
Johnson[).

322.
Adams,
323.
324.
325.
326.

In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1032 (Kan. 2007) (distinguishing In re Marriage of
551 N.E.2d 635 (Ill. 1990)).
No. l 7C913, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22718, at *l (N.D. Ill. Feb. 12, 2018).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018).
Pulliam, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22718, at *12.
Id. at *13.
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where the earlier necessary fraud, duress, or mistake very likely
occurred, and it is in that state where the signatories were actually or
constructively informed of the norms on challenges via existing statutes
and, more importantly, via information supplied on the VAP form. In
child support cases, the laws of the state of the child's current residence
should normally guide as that is where the cost of living and the like will
be most relevant.327 In spousal parentage cases, the laws of the state of
the ceremonial and registered marriage could usually guide spousal
parentage establishment, as here there is certainty (as contrasted with
common law marriage), as well as actual or constructive notice of the
parentage consequences if a spouse gives birth (perhaps only upon
consensual sex). Alternatively, in non-surrogacy assisted reproduction
cases, the childcare parentage interests of semen or ova donors should be
guided by the effects of a preconception writing founded on a particular
state's recommended form, as exists in California,328 as the effects are
recognized in the particular state even where birth occurs outside of that
state. This approach respects the intended parent desires of those
utilizing the form.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The 2017 UPA on "parentage" adjudications follows the 2000 UPA on
"parent-child relationship" adjudications in not expressly r ecognizing
that a sta te court som etim es n eds to u.tiliz i ts rul s on choice of law,
l eading to t he a pplication of another state's laws on p ar en thood. Express
recognition is necessary in the 2017 UPA, as well as in state court
precedents on adjudicating childcare parentage, to accommodate
parentage issues that are not founded on biological ties or formal
adoption. Here, a state court often must assess conduct that occurs
outsid of its bor der s. Childcare pare.1;1tage iss ues dep nden t upon
out-of-stat conduct may involve the in itial deLermina tion of lega l
parenthood or the di s ta blishm nt of ea rli er determined legal
pa ·enthood. Two or more childca1·e parent iss ues in a single case may
n eed to be resolved un der differing U.S. state l a ws, as with child cust ody
and child s uppor t . The need to utilfae choice oflaw rul ·s, a nd som times
to choose non-forum childca.r parent laws, arises due to comity, if not
the fe deral constitutional Full Faith and Credit Clause requir m nt. The
increasing recognition of expanded forms of parentage involving conduct
327. Some current U.S. state laws speak only to full faith and credit to other state VAP
laws on sign ing and on other initial compliance standards, a norm dictated by fed raJ
statute, 42 U.S. '. § 666(a)(5)(C)(iv). See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-311 ; CONN. GEN . STA'r.
§ 46b-l 72(a)(4); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-llA-311 ; WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 14-2-611.
328. CAL. FAM. CODE§ 7613. 5.
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occurring in two or more states at no particular time demand non-forum
parentage laws sometimes be employed in resolving parentage
establishment or disestablishment issues.
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